Pejuang

Founded: Announced 16 September 2020 (Malaysia Day) by Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad following his expulsion from Bersatu on 28 May 2020. ROS approval reportedly granted in mid-2021 after some delays over party name and emblem (verify against ROS records).

Full Name: Parti Pejuang Tanah Air ("Homeland Fighters Party"), commonly abbreviated Pejuang.

Status (2026): Largely dormant minor party with zero federal or state seats. No EXCO or government role at any level.

Founding Figures: - Mahathir Mohamad — Pengerusi (Chairman) until his death on 25 April 2024 - Mukhriz Mahathir — President (Mahathir's son) - Marzuki Yahya — co-founder, former Bersatu Secretary-General - Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman — initially associated but instead launched MUDA (September 2020) - Maszlee Malik — briefly associated post-expulsion; later drifted away - Amiruddin Hamzah — co-founder, former Deputy Finance Minister

Coalition History: - Stayed outside PN and PH at all times - Joined Gerakan Tanah Air (GTA) for GE15 (announced August 2022) — with Berjasa, Putra, IMAN

Electoral Record: - GE15 (19 November 2022): 0 / 222 federal seats; approximately 120 GTA candidates fielded; most lost deposits - Mahathir contested Langkawi (Kedah) and lost to PAS's Mohd Suhaimi Abdullah — Mahathir's first electoral defeat since 1969 - Mukhriz Mahathir lost Jerlun (Kedah)

Position: - Malay-nationalist, Bumiputera-first - Anti-Anwar (personal Mahathir line dating to 1998) - Anti-DAP / anti-Chinese-political-influence framing - Generally anti-PAS-style theocracy (Mahathir was a long-standing critic of hudud politics) - Anti-Najib / anti-1MDB legacy

Slogan: variations of "Berjuang untuk Bangsa, Agama, Negara" ("Fighting for Race, Religion, Country") — overlapping with broader Malay-nationalist rhetoric.

Headquarters: Reportedly in Kuala Lumpur; specific address not widely publicised (verify against party communications).

Significance: Despite zero seats, Pejuang carries outsized symbolic weight because it was Mahathir's last vehicle — bookending a 60+ year political career that began with UMNO in the late 1940s.

Pejuang's ideology mirrors much of Mahathir's personal political worldview developed over 60+ years. The party did not develop a substantially new doctrinal framework — it is more accurately understood as a vehicle for Mahathirist continuity in a post-UMNO, post-Bersatu landscape.

Hedge: Pejuang's formal manifesto documents are limited; ideology summary above synthesises Mahathir's public statements, GE15 GTA campaign material, and Bernama / Malaysiakini reporting. The party did not produce a major policy book or detailed platform.

Hedge: Mukhriz's birth date and detailed early-career biography vary across sources; verify against official parliamentary biographies. Internal Pejuang office-bearer changes since 2024 may not be publicly reported in detail.

Coalition Formation

In August 2022, with GE15 expected before year-end, Mahathir announced the formation of Gerakan Tanah Air (GTA) — translated variably as "Homeland Movement" or "Land Movement" — as a coalition vehicle for Pejuang and a handful of smaller Malay-nationalist parties.

Component Parties (per public reporting): 1. Pejuang — lead component, Mahathir as figurehead, ~80-100 of GTA's federal candidates 2. Berjasa (Parti Barisan Jemaah Islamiah Se-Malaysia) — small Islamist party with roots back to 1977; brought a few candidates 3. Putra (Parti Bumiputera Perkasa Malaysia) — Malay-nationalist micro-party; brought small contingent 4. IMAN — verify exact registered name; brought minor contingent

Total Candidates: Approximately 120 federal candidates across the 222 federal seats (so contesting roughly half the country). State-seat candidates also fielded in some states (counts not widely reported).

Campaign Themes: - "Save Malaysia from DAP control" — anti-DAP framing - Anti-Anwar; anti-Najib (Najib was imprisoned by then but UMNO still ran candidates) - Anti-PAS-style theocracy - Pro-Bumiputera economic preference - Mahathir personally as "elder statesman" guarantor

Resources: GTA was reportedly under-funded relative to BN, PH, and PN. No major corporate donors disclosed publicly; campaign relied on small donations and Mahathir's personal network.

The Result — 19 November 2022

• Federal seats won: 0 / 222
• Most candidates lost deposits (failed to clear one-eighth-of-valid-votes threshold under election law — meaning the RM10,000 deposit per federal seat was forfeited)
• Nationwide vote share: approximately 2% (estimate; verify against SPR aggregated coalition tally)
• Notable individual outcomes:
• - Mahathir Mohamad — contested Langkawi (Kedah), lost to PAS's Mohd Suhaimi Abdullah. Final margin reportedly in the thousands. Mahathir's first electoral loss since first being elected to Kota Setar Selatan in 1959, with an unbroken winning streak from his 1972 UMNO readmission onwards (1969 saw him lose his Kota Setar Selatan seat — making this GE15 loss the first since 1969)
• - Mukhriz Mahathir — contested Jerlun (Kedah), lost
• - Other senior Pejuang candidates — generally lost in single-digit-percent finishes

Why GTA Failed (analyst readings; hedge)

1. Brand confusion — voters did not recognise "GTA" as a distinct coalition; ballot logos confused with other parties
2. Late formation — only ~3 months between coalition launch and election day
3. Mahathir age factor — at 97, voters reportedly viewed him as no longer a viable PM
4. Green Wave — PAS's nationwide surge swept up the Malay-conservative vote that GTA hoped to capture
5. Split anti-Anwar vote — UMNO, PN, and GTA all competed for the same anti-Anwar Malay voters; UMNO and PN had grassroots structure GTA lacked
6. Anti-Mahathir backlash — many Malay voters blamed Mahathir personally for the 2018-2020 chaos (Sheraton, PH collapse)
7. No structural base — Pejuang had no equivalent of UMNO's 1946-built division structure or PAS's 1951 mosque network; impossible to ground-out in months

Hedge: GTA candidate counts and specific component-party totals vary by source; SPR (Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya / Election Commission) records are authoritative. Mahathir's 1969 loss vs subsequent first-loss framing — sources sometimes describe GE15 as his first loss ever (incorrect) and sometimes as his first loss since 1969 (correct per most historical accounts). Verify against parliamentary biographies.

The Seat

Langkawi is a federal parliamentary constituency in Kedah covering the Langkawi archipelago (P.006 in SPR designation). Predominantly Malay-Muslim voter base. Tourism-dependent economy. Mahathir had a long personal association with the island dating to his 1980s-1990s push to develop Langkawi as a duty-free tourist destination — he often framed himself as Langkawi's development champion.

Mahathir won Langkawi at GE14 (9 May 2018) under Bersatu / PH banner — his first time contesting Langkawi (he had previously held Kubang Pasu in Kedah for most of his career). The 2018 win was decisive and reflected the broader PH wave.

The 2022 Field — 4 or 5 Corner Fight

GE15 (19 November 2022) Langkawi candidates (per SPR; verify): 1. Mohd Suhaimi Abdullah — PAS (Perikatan Nasional) — winner 2. Mahathir Mohamad — Pejuang (Gerakan Tanah Air) — lost; reportedly 4th place 3. Ahmad Sohaimi Lazim — UMNO (Barisan Nasional) 4. A PH-PKR candidate — name to verify; finished mid-pack 5. Possibly other minor candidates

The Result (approximate per SPR; verify): - PAS Mohd Suhaimi Abdullah: ~25,000-27,000 votes - BN UMNO Sohaimi: ~10,000-12,000 votes - PH PKR candidate: ~8,000-10,000 votes - Pejuang Mahathir: ~4,500-5,500 votes (4th place, deposit potentially saved depending on exact percentage) - Margin between Suhaimi (winner) and Mahathir (4th): reportedly ~20,000+ votes

Hedge: Exact vote tallies vary by source; SPR official record is authoritative.

Why Mahathir Lost — Analyst Readings

1. Green Wave structural shift — PAS swept Kedah in November 2022 mirroring its August 2023 state-poll dominance later. Sanusi Md Nor's popularity as Kedah MB (since May 2020) lifted PAS candidates statewide
2. 97 years old on polling day — voters reportedly questioned credibility as continuing political force
3. Memory of 2018-2020 chaos — Sheraton Move, PH collapse, leadership-transition drama; many voters held Mahathir personally responsible
4. GTA brand weakness — coalition logo not widely recognised; ballot confusion against established BN, PH, PN logos
5. Split anti-PAS vote — BN UMNO and PH PKR both ran candidates, denying any non-PAS challenger a unified vote
6. Tourism-economy concerns — Langkawi voters reportedly felt left behind by Mahathir's 2018-2020 administration on tourism recovery
7. Local-candidate logic — Mahathir, while associated with Langkawi history, was not a Langkawi-born candidate; PAS's Suhaimi reportedly had stronger local-grassroots credentials

Mahathir's Response

In post-election interviews (per Bernama, Malaysiakini reporting), Mahathir publicly accepted the result but expressed surprise at the scale of defeat. He attributed it variously to: - Misinformation campaigns against him - PAS exploiting religious sentiment - Voter "forgetting" his 22 years of national leadership

He did not announce immediate retirement; he continued making public statements through 2023 and into early 2024.

Historical Significance

The 1969 reference: Mahathir lost Kota Setar Selatan in GE3 (1969) to PAS's Yusof Rawa — that defeat catalysed his "The Malay Dilemma" period and temporary UMNO expulsion. He was readmitted to UMNO in 1972 and re-elected to Kubang Pasu in GE4 (1974), then won every election from 1974 to GE14 (2018) — a winning streak of 48 years across 11 general elections.

The GE15 (19 November 2022) Langkawi defeat ended this streak. For an electorate that had seen Mahathir as a near-permanent fixture of Malaysian politics since the late 1970s, the defeat was psychologically as well as politically significant. Newspaper coverage on 20-21 November 2022 emphasised the "end of an era" framing.

Mahathir Never Re-Contested

After GE15, Mahathir did not contest any by-election or subsequent state poll. His health declined through 2023 with multiple hospitalisations at the National Heart Institute (IJN). He died on 25 April 2024 at age 99. Langkawi at the time of his death was still held by PAS's Mohd Suhaimi Abdullah.

Hedge: Specific vote tallies, candidate names, and percentages should be verified against SPR official Langkawi GE15 results. The "first loss since 1969" framing is widely accepted but specific phrasings vary across sources.

Mukhriz Mahathir's political trajectory illustrates Pejuang's broader story — early prominence as a Mahathir-dynasty heir, multiple state-level executive roles, and post-GE15 marginalisation.

The 2018-2020 collapse — losing the Kedah MB role, then Bersatu expulsion, then GE15 Jerlun defeat — sequentially erased these prospects. By 2026, at age ~61, Mukhriz remains politically active but is widely seen as a residual rather than rising figure.

Hedge: Mukhriz's exact birth date, full educational background, and detailed 2024-2026 movements should be verified against parliamentary biographies and current reporting. Internal Pejuang strategy discussions are not always publicly reported.

One of the most consequential decisions in Pejuang's early history was Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman's choice — almost immediately after the May 2020 Bersatu expulsions — to launch his own party (MUDA) rather than join the Mahathir-Mukhriz vehicle (Pejuang).

Background

Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman: - Born 6 December 1992, Johor Bahru - Former champion debater (Asian University Debating Championship) - Bersatu Pemuda (Youth) chief from founding 2016 - Federal MP for Muar (Johor) since GE14 (9 May 2018) - Minister of Youth and Sports under PH government (2 July 2018 – 24 February 2020) — at 25, the youngest Cabinet minister in Malaysian history - Expelled from Bersatu 28 May 2020 alongside Mahathir, Mukhriz, Maszlee Malik, Amiruddin Hamzah

The 24-Hour Sequence (16-17 September 2020)

• 16 September 2020: Mahathir announces formation of Parti Pejuang Tanah Air
• 17 September 2020: Syed Saddiq announces formation of Malaysian United Democratic Alliance (MUDA) — a separate, distinct party

Why MUDA, Not Pejuang — Analyst Readings

1. Generational positioning — Pejuang was a Mahathir-Mukhriz vehicle anchored in elder Malay-nationalist politics; MUDA was explicitly youth-focused, multi-ethnic, reform-oriented
2. Ideological space — Syed Saddiq positioned MUDA as a "third way" beyond both Malay-nationalist (UMNO/PN/Pejuang) and traditional reform (PH/PKR/DAP) blocs
3. Personal autonomy — joining Pejuang would have subordinated Syed Saddiq to the Mahathir dynasty indefinitely; MUDA gave him his own platform
4. Multi-racial branding — Pejuang is Bumiputera-only by constitution; MUDA explicitly admits all ethnicities as full members
5. Pragmatic distance from Mahathir baggage — Syed Saddiq reportedly recognised Mahathir's 2018-2020 political damage and wanted distance from it

MUDA's Subsequent Path (briefly)

• ROS approval delayed by Muhyiddin's government; approved December 2021 only after court battle
• At GE15 (19 November 2022): MUDA fielded ~30 candidates; Syed Saddiq retained Muar in a 4-corner fight (winning with reported plurality, not majority)
• MUDA won 1 federal seat (Muar) at GE15 — better than Pejuang/GTA's 0
• MUDA has supported the unity government from outside since 2022

Court Case

Syed Saddiq has been entangled in a separate legal case unrelated to MUDA/Pejuang split: - Charged in 2021 with criminal breach of trust (CBT) over Bersatu youth wing funds (~RM1 million) - Convicted at Sessions Court November 2023 with imprisonment sentence - Appeal proceedings have been ongoing through the Court of Appeal - The case has been described by Syed Saddiq supporters as politically motivated; prosecution maintains standard process

Hedge: Specific Syed Saddiq case status, MUDA seat counts at GE15, and Muar margin should be verified against current reporting. Court of Appeal status as of mid-2026 may have shifted.

Implication for Pejuang

Losing Syed Saddiq to MUDA was significant because: - Syed Saddiq brought youth appeal and English-language media credibility - His departure meant Pejuang skewed older and more provincial than necessary - MUDA absorbed political-reform energy that might otherwise have flowed to Pejuang - The 17 September 2020 split symbolised Pejuang's narrow appeal — limited to the Mahathir-loyalist core and a few Bumiputera-nationalist micro-parties

Did Syed Saddiq Make the Right Call?

By 2026 the verdict is mixed: - MUDA still exists (1 seat at GE15) — more than Pejuang - Syed Saddiq retains a parliamentary platform (pending appeal outcomes) - But MUDA itself has been described as struggling — limited grassroots, no breakthrough beyond Muar - Pejuang collapsed after Mahathir's death; MUDA at least continues operating

Both small parties show the difficulty of breaking the entrenched Malaysian political-party ecosystem. The 17 September 2020 split therefore did not produce a winner — it produced two struggling small parties rather than one viable mid-sized one.

Federal Parliamentary Performance

Pejuang did not exist at GE14 (May 2018); the founding members all contested under Bersatu/PH banner then.

State Election Performance

• Pejuang did not field meaningful state-seat slates at any post-GE15 state election (Aug 2023 six-state polls, Johor 2022, etc.)
• Pejuang holds zero state assembly seats nationwide

By-Election Record

• Multiple federal and state by-elections have occurred since GE15; Pejuang has not won any
• Most by-elections Pejuang did not contest at all
• The party's minimal by-election presence reflects resource constraints and strategic decision not to expend forfeited deposits on hopeless contests

Membership Claims

• Pejuang launched September 2020 with reported initial membership ~5,000-10,000 (verify; party claims and independent audits differ)
• Peak membership reportedly ~30,000-50,000 around the 2021-2022 period
• Post-GE15 wipeout: many members reportedly drifted away
• 2024-2026: claimed membership of 20,000-30,000 (party figure; not independently audited)

Malaysian political-party membership claims are notoriously inflated; Pejuang's claims should be treated cautiously.

Funding

• No major corporate donors publicly disclosed
• Small membership fees (modest annual amounts)
• Mahathir's personal political network reportedly contributed during 2020-2024 period
• Post-Mahathir, funding is unclear publicly

Hedge: Specific membership numbers, donation flows, and exact deposit forfeitures should be verified against ROS filings (where public) and SPR records. Pejuang publishes limited transparent financial data.

Comparison to Other Small Malay-Nationalist Parties

Pejuang sits at the bottom of this comparison — youngest, least successful, most dependent on a single personality (Mahathir).

Structural Limits

Why Pejuang has struggled to build: - No incumbent MPs at founding (founding members elected on Bersatu/PH tickets in 2018; lost seats at GE15) - No state-level base (Kedah was Mukhriz's ground but PAS swept it from 2020 onwards) - No major business backers disclosed - No religious-network base (unlike PAS's mosque infrastructure) - No ethnic-association base (unlike MCA's clan associations or MIC's temple networks) - Heavy dependence on Mahathir personality which expired April 2024

These structural constraints make Pejuang a fundamentally different kind of party from UMNO, PAS, or Bersatu — one that may not survive in any meaningful form past GE16.

Post-Mahathir Dormancy (April 2024 onwards)

Since Mahathir's death on 25 April 2024 at age 99, Pejuang has operated in a state of practical dormancy:

• No parliamentary representation (lost all founding MPs at GE15)
• No state assembly representation
• No by-election wins
• Minimal media presence beyond Mukhriz's periodic press appearances
• No major policy initiatives or campaigns
• Membership claims unverified and likely substantially shrunken
• Reports of grassroots drift to other parties

Mukhriz's Role (2024-2026)

Mukhriz Mahathir continues as Pejuang President. His activities have included: - Occasional media interviews positioning Pejuang as a continuing Malay-nationalist alternative - Public statements on national policy questions (subsidy reform, education, foreign affairs) - Attendance at political events without major news impact - No reported attempts to contest by-elections personally

Reported Discussions on Future Direction

Multiple unconfirmed reports through 2024-2026 (Malaysiakini, The Edge, Free Malaysia Today) have mentioned:

1. Merger talks with other small Malay-nationalist parties (Berjasa, Putra, others) — to consolidate the GTA-style coalition into a single registered party. Status unclear; no merger has been formally announced
2. PN dialogue — periodic mentions of Mukhriz exploring rapprochement with Bersatu or PAS. The structural anti-PAS line from Mahathir era makes any PN merger ideologically difficult
3. PH dialogue — even more difficult given anti-DAP framing
4. Quiet wind-down — some commentators suggest Pejuang may simply cease activity without formal dissolution

None of these scenarios has produced concrete movement publicly as of mid-2026.

GE16 Scenarios (must be held by November 2027)

For Pejuang's GE16 prospects:

Hedge: All five scenarios are analyst speculation, not certainty. Pejuang strategy is not publicly detailed.

The Bigger Picture

Pejuang's trajectory illustrates a broader pattern in Malaysian politics: personality-driven parties rarely outlive their founders. Mahathir himself founded or led: - UMNO (joined 1940s, expelled 1969, readmitted 1972, led 1981-2003, resigned 2016) - Bersatu (founded 2016, expelled 2020) - Pejuang (founded 2020, dormant by 2025)

Three parties; one personal political project across 80 years. With Mahathir gone, Pejuang lacks the institutional depth (grassroots networks, ideological school, succession pipeline) that allowed UMNO, PAS, or DAP to outlast their founding generations.

The most likely 2026-2030 trajectory: gradual fade with episodic media moments. The 2027 GE16 may be Pejuang's last formal contest if Scenario A or B applies. After that, the party may persist only on paper as a ROS-registered shell.

Mukhriz's Personal Future

Mukhriz at ~61 in 2026 has plausible time for a further political comeback if structural conditions shift. But absent an external opportunity, the most likely path is gradual withdrawal — periodic media appearances, occasional party statements, no major executive role. His political weight is now substantially less than at his 2013 or 2018 Kedah MB peaks.

Hedge: Pejuang and Mukhriz could surprise — Malaysian politics has produced several unexpected comebacks (Anwar 2022, Najib at points). Current low expectation does not preclude future shifts. But on the base case, Pejuang in 2026 is a residual rather than rising force.

The Final Months

Mahathir Mohamad had multiple hospitalisations in 2022-2024: - 2022 (multiple) — cardiac procedures at IJN - 2023 (multiple) — respiratory infections, follow-up cardiac care - Early 2024 — extended IJN admission

25 April 2024

Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad died at the National Heart Institute (Institut Jantung Negara / IJN), Kuala Lumpur, at age 99 (born 10 July 1925). Cause of death cited variously as cardiac-related and complications from extended illness (verify against official IJN / family statement).

State Funeral and Tributes

• Funeral held with state honours
• Buried at the Heroes' Mausoleum (Makam Pahlawan), Masjid Negara, Kuala Lumpur — alongside other Malaysian leaders
• Thousands of mourners attended
• Tributes from across the political spectrum — including from Anwar Ibrahim (despite the 1998-2024 personal conflict), Najib Razak (despite the 2015-2018 conflict), and most regional leaders
• International tributes from ASEAN heads, Japanese leadership (Look East era), various Islamic and developing-world figures

Mahathir's Final Political Statements

In the months before his death, Mahathir continued making public statements through written articles and limited interviews. Key themes: - Continued anti-Anwar critique - Defence of his 2018-2020 PH government legacy - Concern over Malay political fragmentation - Reflections on Bumiputera economic policy

He did not formally endorse a successor for Pejuang beyond the existing Mukhriz-led structure.

Immediate Pejuang Response

In the immediate post-death period (May-July 2024): - Mukhriz issued formal statements assuming continued leadership - Pejuang held memorial events for members - Limited operational changes announced - Reports of internal discussions about future direction (no public conclusion)

Longer-Term Impact on Pejuang

Mahathir's death effectively removed: - The party's central public figure - The bulk of its donor network (much of which was Mahathir-personal) - The primary anti-Anwar rallying voice in Malaysian Malay-nationalist politics - The institutional memory of decades of UMNO and Malaysian government experience

What remained: - Mukhriz as titular President but with substantially diminished political weight - A small grassroots base concentrated in Kedah and parts of Selangor - ROS-registered party status - Limited financial resources - An ideological brand that no longer had a credible flagbearer

Comparison: Mahathir vs Lee Kuan Yew Succession

Worth noting: Singapore's PAP successfully institutionalised post-Lee-Kuan-Yew (1965-1990 PM, died 2015) succession through party machinery, talent development, and structured leadership transitions. Malaysia's Pejuang did not have an equivalent succession infrastructure. The contrast highlights how Pejuang was always a personal vehicle rather than an institution.

Hedge: Specific cause of death, exact funeral details, and Pejuang post-April-2024 internal discussions should be verified against IJN statements, family communications, and current party reporting.

The "End of an Era" Framing

Malaysian media coverage of Mahathir's death framed it as the closing of a political era extending from independence (Mahathir was elected to Parliament in 1959, 2 years post-Merdeka) to Anwar government (2022 onwards). At 99 years old, with multiple PM tenures and party founder roles, Mahathir was one of the longest-active politicians in modern democratic history.

For Pejuang specifically, the era-ending framing is also a death-knell warning: a party founded explicitly to vehicle one man's political legacy faces existential difficulty when that man is gone. Pejuang in 2026 is exactly such a party.

What Comes Next

Three possibilities for Pejuang post-2024:

1. Slow institutionalisation — Mukhriz and remaining leaders successfully build a non-personality-driven party. Difficult but not impossible. Would require concrete policy platform, grassroots investment, and probably a coalition merger
2. Gradual fade — party persists on paper but contests fewer and fewer elections; eventually de-registered or absorbed
3. Sudden absorption — opportunity arises (e.g., Bersatu fragments) and Pejuang merges into a larger Malay-nationalist vehicle

The base case is (2) — gradual fade — with possible movement towards (3) before GE16. Outcome (1) requires leadership capability and resources Pejuang does not currently demonstrate publicly.

Hedge: All scenarios speculative. Pejuang's actual path will depend on Mukhriz's personal choices, broader political shocks, and resource availability — none of which is precisely predictable.