PBM

Name: Parti Bangsa Malaysia — abbreviated PBM. The Malay phrase "Bangsa Malaysia" translates roughly as "Malaysian Nation" or "Malaysian People", echoing a long-running cross-party slogan for a citizenship-first (rather than ethnicity-first) national identity.

Founded (current form): Rebranded and officially registered as Parti Bangsa Malaysia on 27 October 2021.

Original entity: Sarawak Workers Party (SWP) — founded 2012 by Sng Chee Hua (Larry Sng's father). Larry Sng Wei Shien took over the party leadership in 2013.

President: Larry Sng Wei Shien — born approximately 1975 (hedge on exact DOB); from a prominent Sarawak political family; former Sarawak state assemblyperson and state EXCO; currently MP for Julau, Sarawak.

Parliamentary footprint (May 2026): 1 federal seat — Julau, Sarawak (Larry Sng, won at GE15 on 19 November 2022). No cabinet portfolio. No state assembly seats currently won under the PBM banner. Reporting suggests Larry Sng may also hold a Dewan Negara (Senate) appointment from 2024–2025 — we hedge on this; verify against the Parlimen Malaysia roster.

Coalition status: PBM is not a formal member of Pakatan Harapan, Barisan Nasional, or Gabungan Parti Sarawak. It operates as a small supporting bloc of the Anwar Ibrahim-led unity government — generally voting with the government on confidence and budget matters but without a cabinet role.

Ideology (broad-stroke): Multiracial, multi-religious, reform-leaning, MA63-supportive, Sarawak-inflected. Public policy detail is thin compared with larger parties.

Headquarters: Sarawak-based historically; specific current address not consistently documented across public sources. Hedge.

Symbol and colours: PBM's contesting symbol has been registered with the Election Commission (SPR); the exact graphic and colour palette are not described uniformly across English-language sources and are not reproduced here.

The single most important disambiguation in this guide

PBM (this party — Larry Sng, Sarawak origins, 2021 rebrand) is NOT the same as:

• BERSAMA — Malaysian United Party (the party Rafizi Ramli is associated with from 2026 onwards, per his Wikipedia biography). BERSAMA emerged after Rafizi lost the May 2025 PKR Deputy President race to Nurul Izzah Anwar (3,866 votes to 9,803). It has no documented institutional connection to Larry Sng's PBM.

Reasons the two get confused: 1. Both are small Malaysian parties whose acronyms / shortforms start with similar letters in English coverage. 2. Both are positioned as "reform-adjacent multiracial alternatives" to PKR/DAP/UMNO/PAS — making them rhetorically similar. 3. Some early-stage media reporting labelled Rafizi's vehicle as "Parti Bersama Malaysia" — a phrase that sounds like a Malay rendering of BERSAMA but reads like a variant of "Parti Bangsa Malaysia". The two are different parties.

If you came to this page looking for Rafizi Ramli, go to /bersama-guide.

If you came looking for Larry Sng, you are in the right place.

2012 — Founding as Sarawak Workers Party (SWP)

• Sng Chee Hua, a long-time Sarawak political operator with prior affiliations including Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS), Parti Rakyat Sarawak (PRS), and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), founded SWP as a Sarawak-registered party after a fallout with PKR leadership.
• SWP positioned itself as a vehicle for Sarawak grassroots representation, with particular emphasis on Dayak and rural constituencies.
• Hedge: the precise SPR / ROS registration documents and the exact founding date within 2012 are not consistently documented in the English-language sources reviewed.

2013 — Larry Sng takes over

• Larry Sng Wei Shien, Sng Chee Hua's son, assumed leadership of SWP around 2013.
• Larry had by this point already had a Sarawak state political career — first elected as a state assemblyperson in the early 2000s at a young age, and reportedly holding a state EXCO portfolio at one point. Hedge on exact state EXCO years.

2013–2020 — Quiet years

• SWP retained a low national profile through most of the 2010s.
• Contested limited slates at Sarawak state elections and federal general elections (notably GE13 in 2013 and GE14 in 2018), without significant breakthroughs.
• The party did not become a household name and is rarely cited in standard accounts of Malaysian opposition politics during this period.

February 2020 — Sheraton Move and political reshuffle

• The collapse of the Pakatan Harapan government on 24 February 2020 and the formation of the Perikatan Nasional (PN) government under Muhyiddin Yassin reshaped Malaysian party politics broadly. Many MPs found themselves between affiliations.
• This created the political opening that, by late 2021, SWP / PBM would attempt to exploit.

27 October 2021 — Rebrand to Parti Bangsa Malaysia (PBM)

• SWP officially rebranded and re-registered as Parti Bangsa Malaysia on this date.
• The rebrand explicitly broadened PBM's positioning: from a Sarawak-only "workers" party to a multiracial, national, citizenship-first vehicle open to peninsular and Borneo members alike.
• Hedge: the precise SPR registration certificate number and gazette reference commonly quoted online have not been independently verified for this guide.

Late 2021 to early 2022 — Defector window

• A handful of MPs and state assemblypersons publicly affiliated with PBM in the months after the rebrand, often after exiting Bersatu, PKR, or other parties in the post-Sheraton turbulence.
• Reporting at the time framed PBM as a possible "third force" or landing pad for unaligned MPs.
• By the time GE15 nominations closed in November 2022, most of those affiliations had either lapsed, reverted, or migrated to other parties. Hedge: the precise list of who briefly flew the PBM flag is not consistently reported across sources, and we do not attempt a roster here.

19 November 2022 — GE15

• PBM contested a modest slate of federal seats.
• Won 1 seat: Larry Sng in Julau, Sarawak.
• All other PBM candidates lost; many lost deposits.
• This single-seat outcome set the pattern PBM has held ever since: a one-MP party held together by Larry Sng's personal incumbency in Julau.

December 2022 — Unity government forms

• Anwar Ibrahim was sworn in as Prime Minister on 24 November 2022 at the head of a unity government built from PH, BN, GPS, GRS, Warisan, and supporting MPs.
• PBM, despite holding only one seat, joined the broader bloc of MPs supporting the new government. PBM did not receive a cabinet appointment.

2023 — Supporting bloc, no cabinet role

• PBM voted with the unity government on confidence and budget matters through 2023.
• Larry Sng's parliamentary interventions in this period focused on Sarawak / Dayak constituency issues, MA63 implementation, and rural development — broadly consistent with the party's positioning.

2024–2025 — Senator appointment reporting (hedge)

• There has been reporting that Larry Sng was appointed to the Dewan Negara (Senate) at some point in the 2024–2025 window, alongside his Dewan Rakyat seat.
• We hedge strongly on this: the exact date, term length, and current status of any Senate appointment are not consistently documented in the English-language sources reviewed.
• Readers should verify against the official Parlimen Malaysia roster.

2025 — PKR election turbulence (relevant context, not a PBM event)

• At the 2025 PKR leadership election (14 March – 23 May 2025), Rafizi Ramli lost the Deputy Presidency to Nurul Izzah Anwar by 3,866 votes (28.28%) to 9,803 (71.72%).
• Rafizi subsequently resigned as Minister of Economy on 17 June 2025.
• Per Wikipedia, Rafizi's party affiliation becomes "BERSAMA (Malaysian United Party) — 2026–present".
• This is NOT a PBM event. BERSAMA is a separate party from Larry Sng's PBM. Earlier media confusion notwithstanding, the two have no documented institutional link. This guide flags the distinction repeatedly because it is the single most common error in English-language coverage of small Malaysian parties.

2026 (current) — Status quo holding

• PBM continues with 1 federal seat (Julau).
• Larry Sng remains President.
• The party operates as a small supporting bloc of the unity government.
• No major rebrand, merger, or coalition realignment has been publicly announced as of May 2026.
• GE16 (due by November 2027) seat negotiation positioning has begun in the broader unity government but PBM-specific arrangements are not publicly documented.

Like several small Malaysian parties (MUDA / Syed Saddiq; arguably BERSAMA / Rafizi; historically Warisan / Shafie Apdal in its early years), PBM is effectively coextensive with its founder-figure. Understanding PBM means understanding Larry Sng.

Biographical basics (with hedges)

• Full name: Larry Sng Wei Shien.
• Born: approximately 1975. Hedge — exact date of birth is variably reported.
• Family: Father is Sng Chee Hua, a senior Sarawak political figure with prior affiliations across PBDS, PRS, PKR, and finally SWP / PBM. Larry's political career is widely understood as having begun within his father's networks.
• Ethnicity: Chinese-Malaysian, Sarawak-born — a relatively unusual profile for a Malaysian political party president.

Sarawak state career (early 2000s onwards)

• Larry was first elected to the Sarawak State Legislative Assembly at a young age in the early 2000s, representing a Sarawak state constituency. (At the time, Larry was reported in regional press as one of the youngest assemblypersons in Sarawak's history.)
• He served in the Sarawak state EXCO (executive council) in some capacity during the 2000s decade. Hedge: precise portfolio assignments and dates are inconsistently reported in the English-language sources reviewed.
• His state-level career involved several party changes — a common feature of Sarawak politics, where party labels shift more readily than personal alliances and where state-level coalitions (BN-Sarawak / GPS) operate with distinct dynamics from federal coalitions.

Federal career — Julau (GE15 onwards)

• Larry contested the Julau federal seat in Sarawak at GE15 (19 November 2022) under the PBM banner.
• He won Julau — PBM's only federal seat. Julau is a rural Sarawak constituency with significant Iban and other Dayak voter populations; Larry's win combined family-network history, local development credibility, and the post-Sheraton fragmentation of the larger parties' Sarawak slates.
• Hedge on exact GE15 Julau majority — different summary sources give somewhat different vote totals, and we do not reproduce a specific figure here without first-tier verification.

Possible Senate (Dewan Negara) role

• As noted in the Timeline, reporting suggests Larry Sng was appointed to the Dewan Negara at some point in 2024–2025, parallel to his Julau seat. The status of this appointment is not consistently documented in the sources reviewed and we strongly hedge.

Political positioning

• Multiracial — comfortable presenting in English, Bahasa Malaysia, Mandarin, and conversational Iban (per Sarawak press accounts; hedge).
• Constituency-development oriented rather than ideology-forward in public statements.
• Generally supportive of the unity government and the broader Anwar-led settlement, without taking a high-profile reformist or opposition stance.
• Loud on Sarawak / Dayak / rural-development issues; quieter on national reform debates that animate peninsular politics (judicial appointments, MACC independence, GLC governance).

Why PBM is not just "Larry Sng plus a logo"

There is a legitimate analytical question about whether PBM functions as a real party with grassroots structures or as a vehicle for one MP. The honest answer in mid-2026 is: probably closer to the latter than to the former, in the sense that:

• The party's parliamentary presence is one person.
• Its public statements largely run through Larry Sng or his constituency office.
• Its national-level branch infrastructure outside Sarawak is not publicly documented in any robust way.

But PBM is not formally a "one-MP shell". It has a constitution, an SPR-recognised symbol, and the operational apparatus of a registered Malaysian party. Hedge: details of central committee composition, branch counts, and membership numbers are not consistently documented in the sources reviewed.

PBM has not published a widely-circulated English-language manifesto. This section therefore reflects positions visible in Larry Sng's public statements and parliamentary interventions, plus the framing implied by the October 2021 rebrand. Treat granular policy claims with caution.

1. Multiracial, multi-religious citizenship politics

The name "Bangsa Malaysia" — "Malaysian Nation" — is the most explicit thing PBM does ideologically. It positions the party in the same broad family as PKR, DAP, Amanah, and MUDA: citizenship-first identity, race-blind affirmative-action targeting (needs-based rather than ethnicity-based), and resistance to the ethnic-bloc politics of UMNO and PAS.

2. MA63 and Sarawak/Sabah autonomy

Given its Sarawak origins, PBM has consistently supported faster and fuller implementation of the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) — the constitutional settlement under which Sarawak and Sabah joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. This includes:

• Restoration of Sarawak / Sabah revenue rights (oil royalties, stamp duties, other state-collected federal revenues).
• Recognition of Sarawak / Sabah as equal partners in the federation rather than as states equivalent to peninsular states.
• Devolution of administrative functions historically centralised in Putrajaya.

This positions PBM in dialogue with, rather than competition against, GPS (Gabungan Parti Sarawak) on the autonomy file — though PBM is much smaller and not a formal GPS member.

3. Rural development, particularly in Sarawak

Larry Sng's parliamentary interventions disproportionately concern rural Sarawak constituency issues: road and bridge access in Dayak-majority areas, water and electricity rollouts, agricultural and small-business support for rural communities, Native Customary Rights (NCR) land questions. This is consistent with the Julau seat's constituency profile.

4. Soft alignment with the unity government

PBM supports the Anwar-led unity government on confidence votes and budgets. It is not a vocal critic of cabinet performance. Larry Sng's parliamentary speeches tend to be constructive rather than confrontational. The party has not adopted the maximalist reform posture associated with the HIRUK / Rafizi wing of post-PKR politics.

5. What PBM does NOT loudly stand for

• It is not loud on judicial reform, MACC independence, or GLC governance — the high-profile peninsular reformist issues.
• It is not aligned with PN-style ethnic-religious conservatism in the PAS / Bersatu mode.
• It does not present itself as a youth party in the MUDA mould.
• It does not have a Chinese-business / Chinese-rights framing in the way MCA or DAP can sometimes (in different ways) be characterised.
• It is not a religious party in the PAS / Amanah mode.

6. International / foreign policy

Not a publicly developed pillar. PBM has not articulated a distinctive foreign-policy line. Larry Sng's public statements occasionally engage with regional trade, ASEAN, and Sarawak-specific cross-border issues (timber exports, oil and gas, MA63 implications for federal-state external negotiations) but the party does not present a coherent foreign-policy doctrine in the way larger parties attempt to.

The cleanest summary

PBM is a small multiracial Sarawak-rooted party that operates as a constructive supporting bloc of the unity government, with rural development and MA63 implementation as its strongest publicly identifiable themes. It is neither a maximalist reform party nor an ethnic-bloc party. Its policy bandwidth is constrained by the one-MP reality of its parliamentary presence.

Federal parliamentary seats

Hedge: GE13 and GE14 specifics for SWP are not consistently summarised in English-language sources; the broad pattern is clear (contested small slates, won no federal seats) but exact contested/lost totals are not reproduced here.

State assembly seats

PBM and its predecessor SWP have not won a state assembly seat under the PBM banner in the state election cycles relevant to this guide. (SWP contested some Sarawak state seats in earlier years; results were modest and we do not attempt a full table here.)

Julau, Sarawak — the one win

• Constituency: P.211 Julau, Sarawak.
• Profile: Rural Sarawak federal seat with significant Iban and other Dayak voter populations.
• Larry Sng GE15 result: Won, exact vote total and majority not reproduced here without first-tier verification.
• Why he won: A combination of (a) family-network history in Sarawak politics, (b) PBM's small-party positioning that avoided being captured by the larger Sarawak-coalition (GPS) seat-allocation arithmetic, (c) the post-Sheraton fragmentation that left several Sarawak rural seats more competitive than usual.

By-elections during the 15th Parliament (2022–2026)

• PBM has not been the central actor in any of the major peninsular state by-elections (Kuala Kubu Baharu, Sungai Bakap, Nenggiri, Mahkota, others through 2024).
• The party did not contest these races, focusing — to the extent it has an active extra-Julau presence at all — on Sarawak-specific issues.

Electoral ceiling

PBM's realistic GE16 ceiling is single-digit federal seats and depends almost entirely on whether it can secure a seat-allocation slot inside the unity government umbrella for some number of safer constituencies. Independent contests beyond Julau have not historically gone well for small multiracial parties without coalition backing — MUDA's August 2023 wipeout (0 wins from ~20 seats in three peninsular states) is the recent cautionary tale. Hedge: no first-tier Malaysian pollster has published a PBM-specific GE16 projection at the time of writing.

The PBM / BERSAMA confusion is the single most common error in English-language reporting on small Malaysian parties.

Two different parties. Two different people. Two different lineages.

The naming confusion has a specific origin

• "BERSAMA" in Malay means "together" — a common political slogan word.
• "BANGSA" in Malay means "nation / people / race" — also a common political slogan word.
• English-language transliterations of either word into a party name sound similar enough that careless drafters have rendered Rafizi's vehicle as "Parti Bersama Malaysia" — which then looks superficially like "Parti Bangsa Malaysia". They are not the same. This guide treats them as distinct.

What is reliably true about the relationship between the two parties

• PBM and BERSAMA have no documented institutional link.
• Larry Sng has not publicly merged PBM into BERSAMA.
• Rafizi Ramli has not publicly absorbed PBM's structures.
• There is no public evidence that PBM's registration, symbol, or membership has been transferred or shared with BERSAMA.

What might confuse you in the future

It is theoretically possible that, ahead of GE16, the unity government attempts some kind of small-party consolidation — and that an arrangement involving PBM, BERSAMA, MUDA, and others gets discussed. As of May 2026, no such arrangement has been publicly announced. Treat any "PBM-BERSAMA merger" headline with strong scepticism unless it carries first-tier sourcing and on-the-record statements from both Larry Sng and Rafizi Ramli.

PBM cannot be fully understood outside the broader Sarawak political ecosystem, which operates with distinct dynamics from peninsular politics.

Sarawak's coalition reality: GPS dominance

Sarawak state politics is dominated by Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) — a coalition of PBB (Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu), SUPP (Sarawak United Peoples' Party), PRS (Parti Rakyat Sarawak), and PDP (Progressive Democratic Party). GPS holds the overwhelming majority of Sarawak state assembly seats and is the dominant Sarawak voice in federal coalition negotiations.

Where PBM fits

PBM is a non-GPS Sarawak-rooted party. This is an unusual category in Sarawak politics — most Sarawak-rooted federal MPs sit inside the GPS umbrella. PBM's positioning outside GPS gives it a small amount of independent leverage but also limits its ability to win additional Sarawak seats: in any Sarawak seat where GPS fields a candidate, PBM is competing against the dominant state coalition rather than alongside it.

Julau as a case study

Julau is a Sarawak rural federal seat. Larry Sng's GE15 win there came in a context where the GPS / BN-Sarawak / opposition fragmentation made the seat unusually open. Whether GPS will contest Julau against Larry Sng at GE16 — or accommodate him as a supporting-bloc partner — is one of the small but real open questions of Sarawak GE16 arithmetic. Hedge: no public arrangement has been announced.

MA63 as PBM's common ground with GPS

Despite operating outside GPS, PBM's strongest policy alignment with the Sarawak political mainstream is on MA63 implementation. Both GPS and PBM publicly support restoring Sarawak / Sabah constitutional rights, faster federal-state revenue settlements, and stronger Borneo voice in federal governance. This shared agenda makes outright hostility between GPS and PBM unlikely, even where they are electoral competitors.

What PBM is not, in Sarawak terms

• Not a Dayak-only party (unlike PRS or PBDS historically).
• Not a Chinese-Sarawak party (unlike SUPP historically, or DAP's Sarawak slate).
• Not a Muslim-Bumiputera party (unlike PBB).
• Not a federal-peninsular party with a Sarawak branch (unlike PKR, DAP, Bersatu).

PBM occupies a niche: Sarawak-rooted multiracial, non-GPS, soft-supportive of the federal unity government. The niche is real but small.

The relationship in plain terms

PBM is part of the broad parliamentary bloc that has supported the Anwar Ibrahim-led unity government since its formation in November 2022. PBM is not a registered member of Pakatan Harapan, not a registered member of Barisan Nasional, and not a registered member of GPS. It is a supporting MP / supporting bloc, which in Malaysian parliamentary practice means:

• Voting with the government on confidence motions.
• Voting with the government on annual budgets (Belanjawan).
• Voting with the government on most non-controversial bills.
• Reserving freedom to abstain or vote against specific bills where local-constituency interests diverge.

What PBM does NOT get from this arrangement

• No cabinet position.
• No deputy minister position publicly documented.
• No guaranteed seat-allocation slot at GE16 (negotiations are open).
• No formal coalition voting weight beyond Larry Sng's single vote.

What PBM does get

• Constituency-development access (federal funds for Julau through normal MP channels).
• Parliamentary speaking opportunities.
• Symbolic value of being inside the supporting bloc rather than in opposition — useful for Larry Sng's local political brand.
• A platform from which to engage with the unity government on MA63 and rural-Sarawak issues.

The 17 December 2025 cabinet reshuffle

The major Anwar cabinet reshuffle on 17 December 2025 — which moved Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir into the Economy Ministry, among other changes — did not include a PBM appointment. PBM's position as supporting-bloc-without-cabinet-role was unchanged. This is consistent with the general pattern: very small parties without formal coalition status do not get cabinet portfolios in Malaysian unity-government practice.

Possible GE16 scenarios for PBM's relationship with the unity government

1. Continued supporting-bloc status, no formal coalition entry: Larry Sng defends Julau under PBM. The party stays at 1 seat. Most likely scenario.
2. Negotiated seat-allocation slot for 1–3 winnable Sarawak / Sabah constituencies: PBM gets a small slate inside the unity government umbrella. Plausible but not publicly announced.
3. PBM absorption into a larger unity government party: Larry Sng joins PKR, DAP, or — more plausibly given the Sarawak-base — affiliates with a GPS component party. Possible but undocumented.
4. PBM moves into formal opposition: Unlikely given Larry Sng's current trajectory and policy alignment.
5. PBM merges with another small party: Frequently floated, never executed. As noted in the disambiguation section, a PBM / BERSAMA / MUDA consolidation is theoretically conceivable but has no public basis at the time of writing.

1. The one-MP fragility problem

PBM's entire federal presence rests on Larry Sng's Julau seat. Any event that costs Larry his seat — electoral defeat at GE16, by-election trigger, defection, health, legal issue — costs PBM its entire federal voice. This is structurally similar to MUDA's dependence on Syed Saddiq's Muar seat, and equally fragile.

2. The succession question

PBM has no publicly identifiable second-in-command of comparable political weight. If Larry Sng exits the political stage for any reason, the party's ability to retain its small footprint is genuinely uncertain. Hedge: PBM's central committee composition is not publicly documented in detail in the sources reviewed.

3. The disambiguation problem

The ongoing PBM / BERSAMA confusion in media coverage genuinely harms PBM's brand. Voters and journalists searching for PBM often end up reading about Rafizi Ramli instead, and vice versa — a real political-economy problem for a small party that depends heavily on name recognition.

4. Sarawak-coalition arithmetic

If GPS contests Julau at GE16 — which it may or may not — Larry Sng's seat becomes much more competitive. A direct PBM-vs-GPS Julau race would test whether Larry's personal vote outweighs the dominant Sarawak coalition machine.

5. Federal seat-allocation negotiations

GE16 seat allocations across the unity government are not yet finalised. PBM's ability to negotiate even one or two slots outside Julau depends on factors largely outside its control: PH-BN-GPS internal arithmetic, the post-Rafizi PKR posture toward small parties, and whether the unity government chooses to absorb or marginalise small supporting blocs.

6. The "third force" mirage

PBM was, briefly, framed in late 2021 / early 2022 as a possible "third force" landing pad for unaligned MPs. That framing did not survive contact with GE15. The risk of recurrence — PBM being talked up as a consolidation vehicle for small parties — is real, but the historical record suggests such talk rarely translates into actual mergers in Malaysian small-party politics.

7. Documentation thinness

This guide has had to hedge repeatedly because PBM's public documentation is genuinely thin compared with larger parties. The party's constitution, branch structures, membership numbers, financial accounts, and central committee composition are not robustly published in English-language sources. This is a real epistemic problem for anyone trying to write reliably about PBM, and we have chosen to flag uncertainty rather than fabricate specificity.