This guide flags several claims as unverified — BERSAMA is a new party and public details are still emerging. Treat speculative material accordingly.
In This Guide
Snapshot (What Is And Isn't Verified)
Name (verified): BERSAMA — long form "Malaysian United Party" — per Wikipedia's biography of Rafizi Ramli, which lists "BERSAMA (2026–present)" under his party affiliations. (Earlier drafts of this guide called the party "Parti Bersama Malaysia"; that appears to conflate BERSAMA with Larry Sng's Parti Bangsa Malaysia, which is a separate party. The two should not be merged.)
Headline figure (verified): Rafizi Ramli — born 14 September 1977, Pasir Mas, Kelantan; BEng in Electrical Engineering, University of Leeds; Petronas auditor/manager 2003–2009; MP for Pandan (Selangor, with a Kuala Lumpur footprint) since 2013 (skipped GE14 2018 due to pending legal appeals around the NFC disclosure case); Minister of Economy 3 December 2022 – 17 June 2025; PKR Deputy President 17 July 2022 – 24 May 2025.
The defining event (verified): At the 2025 PKR leadership election (voting 14 March – 23 May 2025), Rafizi lost the deputy presidency to Nurul Izzah Anwar by 3,866 votes (28.28%) to 9,803 (71.72%). The party president, Anwar Ibrahim, was returned unopposed. Two informal blocs contested the election: HIRUK (Rafizi-aligned, named for the Malay word for "noisy/disruptive", positioning itself as the reform-purist wing) and DAMAI ("peace", Nurul-aligned, framed as the coalition-government-stabilisation wing). HIRUK was routed across nearly every contest.
The follow-on (verified for Rafizi and Nik Nazmi, not for others): Rafizi resigned as Economy Minister on 17 June 2025. Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad — who had lost his PKR VP race on 5,656 votes (he finished 5th; the top 4 won) — announced his cabinet resignation on 28 May 2025, effective 4 July 2025. Both are listed on Wikipedia as joining BERSAMA in 2026. Hassan Karim and Akmal Nasrullah are not in BERSAMA: Hassan remains a PKR MP, and Akmal is the current Minister of Economy in Anwar's post-reshuffle cabinet (17 December 2025 –).
What is NOT publicly verifiable as of May 2026: BERSAMA's founding date, registered office, ROS registration number, ballot symbol approval, paid membership count, donor list, cash on hand, internal AGM vote tallies, manifesto text, candidate lists, internal polling, and most named officeholders below President.
Headquarters: Not publicly documented. (Earlier drafts of this guide invented a specific street address; that has been removed.)
Symbol and colours: Not publicly documented at this guide's time of writing.
Why this guide is hedged: The information environment around BERSAMA is unusually thin for a party tied to such a prominent national figure. We have chosen to be conservative rather than speculative — flagging what is reported and what is missing — because Rafizi's political trajectory has historically been turbulent and the line between "rumour" and "platform" has moved fast.
Rafizi's Political Arc (1999 → 2026)
Rafizi Ramli's arc is one of the most cited careers in modern Malaysian politics. Understanding BERSAMA requires understanding it.
1999–2009: Engineer-Auditor at Petronas
- BEng (Electrical Engineering), University of Leeds, 1999 - Joined Petronas in 2003 (per Wikipedia) - Held internal audit and asset-management portfolios across Petronas' petrochemicals businesses through 2009
2010–2014: Reformasi Insurgent
- Joined PKR's strategic team under Anwar Ibrahim's post-Sodomy II rebuild - Appointed PKR Strategic Director 18 December 2010 — running anti-corruption exposés and data-driven campaigns - Central to PKR's 2013 GE13 messaging and ground game; widely credited with helping PKR + DAP win the popular vote that year - 2013 GE13 (Pandan): Won the seat with 48,183 votes (66.73%), majority 26,729, his first parliamentary win
2014–2018: Whistleblower Years
- Appointed PKR Secretary-General 13 October 2014 – 25 November 2016 - PKR Vice President from 20 August 2014 - August 2012: Charged under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 for disclosing bank documents related to the National Feedlot Corporation (NFC) scandal — the case that put then-Wanita UMNO chief Shahrizat Abdul Jalil's family under public scrutiny - 7 February 2018: Sentenced to 30 months' jail (and a further conviction under the Official Secrets Act); both convictions were overturned later — the BAFIA conviction was overturned by the High Court on 15 November 2019 - Skipped GE14 (May 2018) because of pending legal appeals; Wan Azizah Wan Ismail contested Pandan instead (she won with 64,733 votes / 75.47%)
2017–2022: INVOKE Era
- Founded INVOKE Malaysia (registered as a Yayasan/foundation) as a volunteer-driven, data-heavy electoral organisation operating in parallel to (and sometimes in tension with) PKR's formal machinery - INVOKE pioneered Malaysian voter-profile databases, robocall polling, and door-to-door canvassing playbooks adapted from US Democratic Party operations - Specific founding date and audited cumulative funding are not publicly verified; readers should consult INVOKE's own filings for figures
2022: The Return and the Cabinet
- GE15 (19 November 2022): Won Pandan with 74,002 votes (63.98%), majority 48,296 — defeating PN's Muhammad Farique Zubir Albakri (25,706 votes) and BN's Leong Kok Wee (11,664) - 17 July 2022: Elected PKR Deputy President, defeating long-time rival Saifuddin Nasution at the 2022 PKR election - 3 December 2022: Sworn in as Minister of Economy in Anwar's unity cabinet, with Hanifah Hajar Taib as deputy
2023–2024: Reform Friction Inside the Cabinet
Reported (but not always paper-trail confirmed) tensions with cabinet colleagues over: - Subsidy rationalisation sequencing (diesel, RON95, electricity tariff brackets) - GLC governance and the pace of board reform at Khazanah, EPF, PNB, and KWAP - The Attorney-General's decision to grant Zahid Hamidi a DNAA on 47 charges in September 2023 - Court Cluster figures returning to UMNO front bench positions
Rafizi's public commentary stayed within "constructive coalition partner" boundaries through 2023; by mid-2024, his speeches and podcast appearances were sharper. The exact dates of internal cabinet disputes are not reliably documented in public sources.
2025: The Election and the Exit
- 14 March – 23 May 2025: PKR leadership election. Anwar wins president unopposed. Rafizi runs for re-election as Deputy President against Nurul Izzah Anwar. - 23 May 2025: Final votes counted. Nurul Izzah 9,803, Rafizi 3,866 — a 2.5x margin. HIRUK faction routed across vice-presidencies too (Nik Nazmi 5th on 5,656 votes; Sim Tze Tzin failed to make the top 4). - 24 May 2025: Rafizi's tenure as PKR Deputy President ends. - 28 May 2025: Nik Nazmi announces his cabinet resignation. - 17 June 2025: Rafizi resigns as Minister of Economy. Amir Hamzah Azizan (concurrent Finance II Minister) takes over the Economy portfolio in acting capacity from 27 June 2025. - 4 July 2025: Nik Nazmi's cabinet resignation takes effect; the Natural Resources, Environment and Climate Change portfolio (which Johari Abdul Ghani had held since 12 December 2023, when Nik Nazmi was first reshuffled out) settles under Johari.
2026: BERSAMA
- Per Wikipedia, Rafizi's party affiliation becomes "BERSAMA (2026–present)". Public documentation of the party itself remains sparse at the time of writing.
The 2025 PKR Leadership Election (HIRUK vs DAMAI)
The 2025 PKR election is the single most important event in BERSAMA's backstory. Without the HIRUK rout, there is no Rafizi exit.
Format and timing
- Voting period: 14 March 2025 – 23 May 2025 - Electorate: PKR delegates (not all members) — a point HIRUK loyalists later flagged as part of why they lost; DAMAI argued delegates better insulated against money politics - Allegations during the process: voting system vulnerabilities, vote-buying, branch-level interference. Both blocs filed complaints. Nothing was upheld at a level that overturned results.
Results (per the 2025 PKR leadership election Wikipedia article)
President (uncontested): - Anwar Ibrahim — won unopposed (100%)
Deputy President: - Nurul Izzah Anwar — 9,803 votes (71.72%) - Mohd Rafizi Ramli — 3,866 votes (28.28%) - Margin: 5,937 votes; ~2.5x ratio
Vice Presidents (top 4 of a larger field elected): 1. Amirudin Shari — 7,955 2. Ramanan Ramakrishnan — 5,895 3. Aminuddin Harun — 5,889 4. Chang Lih Kang — 5,757
Notable also-rans: - Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad — 5,656 (5th, missed VP cut by ~100 votes) - Sim Tze Tzin — 5,085 - Hee Loy Sian — 3,642
The two factions
- HIRUK ("noise/commotion") — Rafizi-aligned. Posture: continue Reformasi anti-corruption maximalism, push back against Court Cluster rehabilitation, accept short-term coalition costs for long-term reform credibility. - DAMAI ("peace") — Nurul Izzah-aligned and broadly endorsed by Anwar loyalists. Posture: stabilise the unity government, deliver economic results, treat reform as an inside-the-tent project, do not blow up the coalition over individual prosecutorial decisions.
DAMAI swept. The implication: PKR's delegate base — which under "old PKR" had been Rafizi's home turf — moved decisively toward the Anwar-family/coalition-stability axis. This is the political fact BERSAMA exists to answer.
Why it matters for BERSAMA
- Rafizi's authority inside PKR became fictional after 24 May 2025 - His policy disagreements with the cabinet no longer had any party-mechanical outlet - His personal brand (data, anti-corruption, podcast reach) had outgrown the role of "ordinary backbencher" - The logical move was either (a) cooperate as a private MP, (b) form an independent grouping, or (c) attach to a small existing party. BERSAMA appears to be variant (b) or (c).
Leadership: What's Confirmed, What Isn't
Most of what previously appeared in this section — Secretary-General, Treasurer, Information Chief, Youth/Women/Borneo wing chairs, founding committee membership numbers, AGM vote tallies — has not been publicly documented at this guide's time of writing. We have removed all unverifiable named appointments. Below is what we can confirm.
Rafizi Ramli — associated with BERSAMA since 2026 (Wikipedia)
- Born 14 September 1977, Pasir Mas, Kelantan - BEng (EE), Leeds, 1999 - Petronas 2003–2009 (petrochemicals audit, asset management) - PKR career: Strategic Director (2010), Sec-Gen (2014–2016), VP (2014–2022), Deputy President (2022–2025) - MP, Pandan: 2013–2018 (did not contest 2018), 2022–present - Minister of Economy: 3 December 2022 – 17 June 2025 - Sentenced 7 February 2018 (BAFIA, NFC disclosure); High Court overturned 15 November 2019 - INVOKE Malaysia founder (date not reliably documented in the sources reviewed)
Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad — listed as BERSAMA since 2026 (Wikipedia)
- Born 1982, Kuala Lumpur - Bar-called (London 2005, Malaysia 2006) - MP Setiawangsa - Minister of Natural Resources, Environment and Climate Change: 12 December 2022 – 12 December 2023 - After 12 December 2023, the portfolio passed to Johari Abdul Ghani - Lost PKR VP race 2025 (5,656 votes, 5th place) - Announced cabinet resignation 28 May 2025, effective 4 July 2025
Officeholders previously listed in this guide that we are removing
- "Yin Shao Loong as Secretary-General" - "Tricia Yeoh as Treasurer-General" - "Hassan Karim as Information Chief" - "Howard Lee as Youth Chief" - "Maria Chin Abdullah as Women Chief" - "Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir as Grassroots Chief" - "Edmund Santhara Kumar as Plantation portfolio shadow" - "Larry Sng as President Emeritus" (Larry Sng leads Parti Bangsa Malaysia, a separate party)
None of these appointments are confirmed by the sources reviewed for this revision. They may be true, partially true, or fabricated. They have been removed pending verification.
Who is *not* in BERSAMA
- Hassan Karim — Wikipedia's article on him (last updated April 2026) still records him as PKR; his most recent recorded party-affiliation event is a December 2024 PKR disciplinary board matter resolved without action. - Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir — currently Minister of Economy in Anwar's cabinet (since the 17 December 2025 reshuffle); has not left PKR.
Pandan: The Single Confirmed BERSAMA-Adjacent Seat
Rafizi's Pandan seat is the only constituency where the BERSAMA story has clear electoral arithmetic to work with.
Pandan basics
- Federal constituency P101, Selangor - Suburban-urban: includes parts of Cheras, Pandan Jaya, Pandan Indah, Pandan Perdana - Mixed demographics — significant Chinese, Malay, and Indian voter populations - A historically PKR-Pakatan stronghold in modern Malaysian electoral cycles
GE13 (2013) — Rafizi's first win - Rafizi (PKR): 48,183 votes, 66.73% - Majority: 26,729
GE14 (2018) — Rafizi sat out - Wan Azizah Wan Ismail (PKR): 64,733 votes, 75.47% - Rafizi did not contest, citing pending legal appeals
GE15 (2022) — Rafizi's return - Rafizi (PKR): 74,002 votes, 63.98% - Majority: 48,296 - PN candidate Muhammad Farique Zubir Albakri: 25,706 - BN candidate Leong Kok Wee: 11,664
The GE16 question
The hard problem for BERSAMA is that the 48,296 majority was PKR-on-the-ballot against PN and BN. In GE16, three scenarios diverge sharply:
- Rafizi runs on a BERSAMA ticket; PKR fields its own candidate. The PKR vote splits. PN potentially walks up the middle in a 3-way fight. Rafizi's personal vote is a known quantity; PKR's residual machine vote is the unknown.
- PH negotiates a non-contest for Rafizi in Pandan as a personal courtesy. Politically awkward (Anwar loyalists would object) but historically not unprecedented — Malaysia's coalition culture has accommodated this kind of accommodation before.
- Rafizi runs as nominal BERSAMA but with quiet PKR-grassroots tolerance. A grey-zone outcome. Difficult to model.
No public-poll-grounded seat projections exist for BERSAMA as of May 2026. Treat anything more specific than "Pandan is Rafizi's; the rest is speculation" as marketing rather than analysis until a Merdeka Centre or ISEAS poll appears.
Rafizi's Critiques of the Madani Government
Rafizi's post-cabinet commentary — via interviews, parliamentary speeches, and his "Yang Bakar Menteri" podcast — sketches the policy positioning BERSAMA is likely to inherit. The themes below are publicly observable.
1. The Zahid DNAA and the Court Cluster question
On 4 September 2023, the Attorney-General discontinued 47 charges against Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi via a Discharge Not Amounting to Acquittal (DNAA). Rafizi did not lead the public attack from inside cabinet but was widely understood to be uncomfortable with the decision. His broader concern: that PH's coalition with BN normalised the rehabilitation of figures Reformasi spent two decades opposing, undermining PKR's anti-corruption brand.
2. Subsidy rationalisation
As Economy Minister, Rafizi was responsible for the framework on diesel and (later) RON95 targeted subsidy reforms. The diesel rationalisation went live in Peninsular Malaysia in mid-2024 amid significant public friction. RON95 targeting was deferred. Rafizi's public position: targeting saves fiscal space and redistributes to B40/M40 households; his critique of how implementation later unfolded under successors is gentle in language but firm in substance.
3. GLC governance
A long-standing Rafizi theme, predating his time in cabinet. The argument: Malaysia's GLCs and GLICs (Khazanah, EPF, KWAP, PNB, LTAT, Tabung Haji, MoF Inc holdings) are too closely tied to political patronage, with board appointments insufficiently insulated from party-political incentives. Reform proposals associated with this position — independent nomination committees, executive-pay ratio caps, sunset clauses for under-performing GLCs — remain in the broader policy conversation rather than as confirmed BERSAMA manifesto items.
4. Pace of reform, full stop
The deeper Rafizi critique is meta: that the Madani government's instinct to "stabilise first, reform later" amounted to "stabilise indefinitely, reform never". This is the argument the HIRUK faction lost at the 2025 PKR election. Whether it has any institutional home outside Rafizi's own podcast feed is the central BERSAMA question.
5. Bangsa Malaysia / race-based affirmative action
Rafizi has historically argued for income-decile (B40/M20) targeting rather than ethnicity-based quotas. This is broadly consistent with PKR's founding doctrine, though it has always been more rhetorically prominent than electorally enforceable. Specific glidepath proposals (e.g., a "15-year wind-down") are political talking points associated with the reformist wing rather than confirmed BERSAMA policy.
INVOKE Malaysia: The Machinery Question
INVOKE — founded by Rafizi as a registered Yayasan (foundation) — is the technical and organisational asset most often cited as BERSAMA's competitive moat.
What INVOKE genuinely is (the parts that are publicly observable)
- A voter-data and electoral-operations non-profit - Operated through the 2018, 2022, and various by-election cycles - Developed Malaysia's first systematic voter-profile database run outside formal party structures - Trained large numbers of volunteers in canvassing, robocall polling, and digital-organising techniques - Has historically functioned as a Rafizi-loyal "shadow PKR" that PKR's formal organisation tolerated when convenient and resented when not
What this guide will NOT claim
- Specific dataset sizes (e.g., "2.1m profiles", "890k verified mobile numbers") - Specific paid-organiser counts by state - Specific transfer values from INVOKE to BERSAMA - Specific AWS / cloud infrastructure details - That INVOKE data has been "ported into BERSAMA systems" — this is a contested PKR-internal allegation, not a documented fact
Earlier drafts of this guide contained all of the above as confident specifics. They have been removed.
What can be said honestly
- INVOKE represents organisational capital — trained operators, institutional memory, scripts, vendor relationships — that does not evaporate when Rafizi loses an internal party election - The legal question of whether INVOKE's data assets can be lawfully used by a separate political party (BERSAMA) under the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 is non-trivial and unresolved publicly - PKR loyalists have publicly suggested (rather than litigated to conclusion) that INVOKE's data collected under PKR campaigning belongs to PKR; the legal merit of this depends on consent forms used at the time of collection
The Nurul Izzah Counterpoint
Any honest BERSAMA guide has to engage seriously with the person who beat Rafizi, because the political logic of BERSAMA is in large part a reaction to her victory.
Nurul Izzah Anwar: the quick biography
- Eldest daughter of Anwar Ibrahim and Wan Azizah Wan Ismail - Long career as a parliamentary representative (Lembah Pantai, then Permatang Pauh; lost her seat at GE15 in November 2022) - Post-GE15: served as economic and social policy adviser to the Prime Minister in informal capacity; chair of the Polity think tank (publicly confirmed as of January 2025) - 23 May 2025: Elected PKR Deputy President, defeating Rafizi 9,803 to 3,866
The DAMAI argument she made and won on
The internal pitch — broadly endorsed by Anwar loyalists and large parts of PKR's state-level apparatus — was: - The unity government is structurally fragile; rocking the boat hands PN majority government - Reform happens in the ministries, not in the press releases - A party deputy presidency should be in service of the prime ministership, not in opposition to the cabinet - HIRUK-style maximalism, applied to a coalition partner like UMNO, breaks the coalition and ends Reformasi as a governing project
She offered Rafizi a role in the new PKR leadership after winning; per public reporting, he declined. Her public framing — "Win or lose, Rafizi's forever a friend" — suggests an intent to keep the door open even as their projects formally diverged. Whether BERSAMA closes that door or leaves it ajar is one of 2026's small open political dramas.
Why this matters for BERSAMA
- The PKR delegate base — which is the closest thing to a "real" PKR opinion poll — preferred DAMAI 72-28. That is not a narrow loss; that is a generational repudiation of Rafizi's strategy within his own party. - BERSAMA's rationale is roughly "the delegates were wrong; the voters are different". This is an empirically testable hypothesis. GE16 will test it. - If GE16 returns a strong PH performance under a Nurul-deputy / Anwar-president PKR, the BERSAMA project becomes politically isolated. If GE16 returns a weak PH performance with BERSAMA winning a few seats, the post-election PH reconfiguration looks very different.
The 17 December 2025 Cabinet Reshuffle
The reshuffle that closed the post-Rafizi cabinet chapter is worth recording in detail because it tells you what the Madani government chose to do with the portfolio Rafizi held.
Economy Ministry transition - Rafizi Ramli: 3 December 2022 – 17 June 2025 - Amir Hamzah Azizan (acting, concurrent Finance II): 27 June 2025 – 17 December 2025 - Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir: 17 December 2025 – incumbent
The choice of Akmal Nasrullah is politically pointed. Akmal had previously served as Deputy Foreign Minister, has roots in PKR Johor, and is part of the PKR generation broadly aligned with the Anwar succession axis — not the Rafizi-INVOKE network. Promoting him to a senior economic portfolio sends the signal that the Economy Ministry is firmly inside the PKR coalition tent, not floating in some technocratic above-politics space.
Natural Resources / Environment transition
- Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad: 12 December 2022 – 12 December 2023 - Johari Abdul Ghani (UMNO): 12 December 2023 – 4 July 2025 (held it during Nik Nazmi's remaining cabinet time too, after Nik Nazmi was reshuffled out of this portfolio at end of 2023) - (Nik Nazmi formally exited cabinet 4 July 2025 from whatever final ministerial assignment he held after the December 2023 reshuffle)
The political read
- Putting a UMNO minister (Johari) in the climate / natural resources portfolio in late 2023 was an early signal of how cabinet equilibrium was settling. It also made the Madani government's ESG positioning a UMNO file rather than a PKR file — an outcome PH activists found uncomfortable. - The 17 December 2025 reshuffle, six months after the HIRUK rout and Rafizi's exit, completed the displacement of the Rafizi-aligned generation from senior economic decision-making. - BERSAMA, as a political project, is in part a vehicle for a generation of PKR reformers who no longer have a home in either the cabinet or the PKR Supreme Council.
Open Questions and Internal Risks
1. Does BERSAMA actually have any formal apparatus yet?
The single biggest open question. Most parties going into a general election have ROS registration, an SPR-approved symbol, branch structures in multiple states, a constitution, an AGM-elected supreme council, and audited accounts. The publicly available record for BERSAMA on any of these is thin. This may reflect the party being new and below media radar; it may also reflect the project being aspirational rather than operational. Earlier drafts of this guide manufactured specifics across all of the above — they have been removed.
2. The "walked away from power" critique
PKR loyalists argue Rafizi abandoned the unity government at a vulnerable moment in mid-2025, enabling PN momentum into 2026–2027. Rafizi's defenders argue he was fired by the delegates, not the voluntary defector the loyalists describe — he ran for re-election as PKR Deputy President and lost. Both framings are factually defensible; the political-narrative fight between them will continue.
3. The cabinet-loyalty paradox
If BERSAMA's critique is that the Madani government compromised on reform, and BERSAMA's known/likely senior figures (Rafizi, Nik Nazmi) served in that cabinet for 2+ years executing those compromises, the obvious question is "why did you participate?". Rafizi's public answer pattern is "we tried from inside, we failed, that's why we are outside". Whether voters accept it depends on whether they see Rafizi as principled-but-late or opportunistic.
4. The thin-membership problem
A reform party without a religious-affairs wing, without a Bumiputera-rights pillar, and without organic structures in rural Malay seats is functionally an urban professional-class party. Malaysia's electoral geometry penalises urban-only parties — rural and semi-rural seats are over-weighted by delimitation. The structural ceiling on a BERSAMA-shaped party is widely speculated to be low double-digit seats nationally at best, even before considering 3-way splits with PKR.
5. The Anwar succession variable
PKR after Anwar — at some future date — is a different party. Nurul Izzah, Saifuddin Nasution, Amirudin Shari, and others would jockey. A non-Anwar PKR might be more or less inclined to absorb BERSAMA back, depending on who wins. None of this is on the table publicly in mid-2026, but it is the largest medium-term strategic variable.
6. The data-sovereignty question (real but unresolved)
The INVOKE-vs-PKR data dispute mentioned above is genuinely open. If it ends up before the Personal Data Protection Department, the outcome could meaningfully constrain BERSAMA's operational reach.
7. Brand confusion with Parti Bangsa Malaysia
"BERSAMA" (Malaysian United Party) is not "PBM" (Parti Bangsa Malaysia, Larry Sng). Multiple early-stage media references conflated the two; the confusion benefits neither party.
Sources & References
Data in this guide is cross-referenced against the following official sources.
- Registrar of Societies (ROS) Primary authority for party registration — source to verify BERSAMA's formal registration status
- Election Commission Malaysia (SPR) Official electoral results for Pandan (GE13–GE15) and party ballot symbol approvals
- Wikipedia: Rafizi Ramli Biography and party affiliations including "BERSAMA (2026–present)"
- Wikipedia: 2025 PKR leadership election Verified vote tallies: Nurul Izzah 9,803 vs Rafizi 3,866; HIRUK vs DAMAI faction results
- Malaysiakini Primary coverage of PKR election, Rafizi's resignation as Economy Minister, and cabinet reshuffle