GRS

Coalition Formed: 9 September 2020, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. Multi-party electoral umbrella assembled just three weeks before the snap Sabah state election of 26 September 2020.

Status (2026): Governs the Sabah state government with Hajiji Noor as the 16th Chief Minister of Sabah. Holds approximately 6 federal seats. Component of Anwar Ibrahim's unity government at federal level since 24 November 2022.

Power Period: Continuous control of the Sabah state government since 29 September 2020. First federal coalition partner role: November 2022 unity government with PH-BN-GPS-Warisan.

Membership: GRS is a coalition; constituent parties have separate memberships. PGRS (founded 2022 by Hajiji) is the dominant constituent. Total combined membership across constituent parties is reported in the low hundreds of thousands but precise figures are not consistently published.

Key Distinguishing Features:

• Sabah-only coalition (does not contest peninsular)
• Multi-ethnic by necessity, Sabah has the most diverse demographic mix in Malaysia (Kadazan-Dusun, Bajau, Murut, Suluk, Malay, Chinese, Bugis-origin communities)
• Looser internal coherence than GPS in Sarawak, multiple parties, occasional defections
• "Sabah First" (Sabah Maju Jaya) orientation
• Pragmatic federal alignment, supported PN, then unity government
• Sabah Chief Minister title retained (no "Premier" retitling unlike Sarawak)

Headquarters: Kota Kinabalu, Sabah (multiple constituent-party offices; coordination via Chief Minister's Department).

Symbol and Colours: GRS branding uses orange and blue prominently; constituent parties retain their individual logos for election purposes.

Constituent Parties (2026, approximate, composition has shifted):

1. PGRS (Parti Gagasan Rakyat Sabah), founded 2022 by Hajiji Noor and former Bersatu Sabah members; dominant GRS constituent
2. STAR Sabah (Parti Solidariti Tanah Airku Sabah), led by Jeffrey Kitingan; Kadazan-Dusun-Murut (KDM) base
3. SAPP (Sabah Progressive Party), led by Yong Teck Lee; Chinese-Malaysian and mixed Sabah-nationalist base; founded 1994
4. PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah), led by Maximus Ongkili (long-time party president); KDM and multi-ethnic base; founded 1985
5. LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), Chinese-Malaysian base; smaller party
6. USNO (United Sabah National Organisation), revived in modern form; historical Sabah Malay-Muslim party originally founded 1961

Chief Minister of Sabah: Hajiji Noor, Chairman of GRS and 16th Chief Minister of Sabah since 29 September 2020.

Note on Sabah BN (UMNO Sabah): Often spoken of in the same breath as GRS but technically a separate coalition. Sabah BN MLAs supported the GRS state government from 2020 onwards. Bung Moktar Radin (UMNO Sabah leader) served as a Deputy Chief Minister. Relations have wobbled multiple times but the working arrangement has endured.

Note on Bersatu Sabah: Originally a central GRS pillar in 2020. After 2022 disputes with peninsular Bersatu leadership, Hajiji and most Bersatu Sabah members defected to form PGRS. The status of any residual Bersatu Sabah within GRS is unclear and disputed.

The timeline above carries the dates. This section is about the mechanics behind them: why the crisis took the shape it did, and why the coalition it produced is built the way it is.

Pre-2018 Sabah Political Context

Sabah politics ran through a sequence of vehicles rather than one durable machine. USNO, founded in 1961 by Tun Mustapha Harun, dominated the 1960s and 1970s. Berjaya was assembled in 1975 specifically to displace it, and governed until PBS displaced Berjaya in turn. PBS joined BN and later left it. UMNO entered Sabah directly in 1991 and became the dominant force through the 1990s and 2000s, until Warisan took the state in 2018. Each of these transitions replaced the governing vehicle outright. Sabah has never settled into an alternation between two stable blocs, and the 2020 crisis repeated the pattern.

How the Sheraton Move Reached Sabah

The Sheraton Move brought down the federal PH government in February 2020 by peeling members away from it, with no election involved. That method was then available in Sabah, where Warisan governed with PH allies on a workable margin rather than a commanding one. A change of government by statutory declaration requires no vote, only a majority of signatures presented to a head of state, so the survival of the state government became a counting exercise it could lose on any given day.

Shafie Apdal's answer was to remove the thing being counted. Advising dissolution meant the assembly Musa Aman claimed to control no longer existed, and the claim lapsed with it. The price was a snap election in the middle of a pandemic, which he lost narrowly. He traded a near-certain loss of office by defection for an uncertain one at the ballot box.

Why the Umbrella Was Built the Way It Was

Three weeks is not enough time to negotiate a merger, so GRS was assembled as a joint umbrella. Each constituent kept its own party, its own leadership and its own claim on seats, with the federal PN government under Muhyiddin Yassin brokering the allocation between Bersatu Sabah, STAR Sabah under Jeffrey Kitingan, SAPP under Yong Teck Lee, PBS under Maximus Ongkili, LDP and the revived USNO. Sabah BN under Bung Moktar Radin was coordinated with rather than absorbed. That design explains both facts about GRS: it came together in weeks, and it has been fragile ever since, because nothing structural holds a constituent that decides to walk.

2020-2022, PN Federal Alignment

GRS aligned with the federal PN government under Muhyiddin (March 2020 to August 2021) and then under Ismail Sabri (BN-led, August 2021 to November 2022). Federal-state business in this period focused on:

• COVID-19 response and vaccination rollout
• MA63 implementation working committee (begun under PN, continued under the unity government)
• Pan Borneo Highway Sabah portion (ongoing delays)
• Sabah revenue and the 40% claim (no substantive progress)

The alignment delivered process on MA63 and little beyond it. The working committee convened, the 40% claim did not move, and the highway stayed late.

What the PGRS Split Was About

The 2022 break with peninsular Bersatu came down to who selects Sabah candidates and who sets the line on Sabah autonomy, the same question the state has put to every peninsular partner since 1963. Hajiji's answer was to take the members and leave the party. The exact registration date and full founding circumstances of PGRS should be verified against Registrar of Societies records. The political effect is that the largest component of GRS is now a party with no peninsular parent, which removes the pressure point that broke the Bersatu Sabah arrangement and gives Hajiji a base no outside leadership can discipline.

1. Sabah Maju Jaya / Sabah First

GRS's defining ideological frame. Sabah's interests are prioritised within the Malaysian federation. Specific positions:

MA63 Implementation:

• Full restoration of MA63 entitlements (immigration control, religious affairs, native rights)
• Push for the 40% federal revenue share provision (long unmet)
• Petroleum royalty increase (5% to 20%, joint demand with Sarawak/GPS)
• Education curriculum input
• Sabah-specific public service quota and Borneanisation

Sabah Maju Jaya Development Plan:

• Hajiji's signature development blueprint (announced 2021)
• Targets economic transformation by 2025-2030
• Pillars: infrastructure (Pan Borneo Highway), tourism, palm oil downstream, gas industry, agriculture, digital economy
• Implementation has been mixed, major infrastructure projects continue with federal allocations

2. Multi-Ethnic Coalition Composition

Sabah's ethnic diversity is the most complex in Malaysia, and GRS's coalition structure reflects (imperfectly) this diversity:

This patchwork reflects Sabah's genuine diversity but also exposes coordination challenges, GRS lacks a single dominant party comparable to PBB in GPS.

3. Pragmatic Federal Alignment

GRS does not strongly adhere to peninsular ideological labels:

• Aligned with PN under Muhyiddin (2020-2021)
• Aligned with BN-led federal government under Ismail Sabri (2021-2022)
• Currently aligned with PH-led unity government under Anwar (2022+)
• Will likely align with whichever peninsular coalition best serves Sabah interests in future

This regional-first posture sets GRS apart from peninsula-based reform parties like MUDA, which organise around a national multiracial platform rather than state autonomy.

4. Economic and Social Outlook

GRS economic policy emphasises:

• Resource sovereignty: oil, gas, palm oil, timber, increased state share of revenue
• Tourism: Mount Kinabalu, Sipadan, Tunku Abdul Rahman Marine Park, Sandakan
• Agriculture and palm oil: downstream processing within Sabah rather than raw exports
• Infrastructure catch-up: Pan Borneo Highway, rural electrification, water supply
• Digital and connectivity: 5G rollout, undersea cable links

Socially:

• Moderate-conservative
• Religiously plural, Sabah has the highest Christian population proportion in Malaysia (approximately 26-27%) alongside Muslim majority (approximately 65%) and other faiths
• More tolerant of religious pluralism than peninsular Bumiputera politics

5. Religious Position

Unlike peninsular UMNO or PAS, GRS is religiously plural by necessity:

• Sabah has approximately 26-27% Christian population (mostly KDM and Chinese)
• Approximately 65% Muslim population (Malay, Bajau, Suluk, Bugis-origin, Indonesian-origin)
• Other faiths and indigenous animist traditions
• Less aggressive Islamic-state advocacy
• Practical protection of religious freedom

6. Foreign Worker and Immigration Politics

Sabah's immigration politics are uniquely fraught due to:

• Long history of irregular migration from Philippines (Suluk, Bajau) and Indonesia
• The "Project IC" controversy (allegations of irregular citizenship issuance dating to the 1990s)
• The RCI on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah (Royal Commission, 2012-2014) which documented systematic irregularities
• Continuing political contestation over voter rolls and demographic balance

GRS, like all Sabah-based parties, must navigate this terrain carefully, promising tighter border controls while not alienating long-established immigrant-origin communities.

Chairman (GRS) and Chief Minister of Sabah: Hajiji Noor

• Full title: Datuk Seri Panglima Haji Hajiji bin Haji Mohd Noor
• Born: 1 June 1955, Tuaran, Sabah
• Ethnic background: Bajau-Suluk Muslim
• State assembly seat: Sulaman (Tuaran district)
• Political career:
• Long-time Sabah BN/UMNO member before joining Bersatu Sabah
• Bersatu Sabah chairman (until 2022 split)
• Founded PGRS in 2022
• 16th Chief Minister of Sabah since 29 September 2020
• Style: Consensual, lower-key than predecessors; described as a steady hand rather than a dramatic political figure
• Signature programme: Sabah Maju Jaya Development Plan (2021+)

At 70 years old in 2025, Hajiji's succession question is open, no clear PGRS heir-apparent has been publicly designated as of 2026. Potential successors discussed in Sabah political circles include senior PGRS figures and possible cross-party candidates from STAR or PBS, but no consensus has emerged publicly.

Deputy Chief Ministers (Sabah State Cabinet)

Sabah has historically had multiple Deputy Chief Ministers reflecting the three major ethnic blocs (Muslim, KDM Christian, Chinese). Under the GRS state government, Deputy CM positions have included:

• Bung Moktar Radin (UMNO Sabah / BN), Deputy Chief Minister (until various reshuffles)
• Jeffrey Kitingan (STAR Sabah), Deputy Chief Minister
• Joachim Gunsalam (PBS), Deputy Chief Minister at various points
• Other constituent-party Deputy CM positions allocated across reshuffles

Exact incumbents in 2026 have shifted across the wobble cycles; the underlying logic of one-Muslim-one-KDM-one-Chinese Deputy CM allocation has generally held.

Federal Cabinet Representation (2026)

Following the 24 November 2022 unity government formation, GRS received the following approximate federal portfolios (composition has changed across reshuffles):

• Minister of Entrepreneur Development and Cooperatives (or similar portfolio), held by a GRS leader
• Several Deputy Minister positions, across portfolios such as Tourism, Rural Development, Higher Education, Plantation
• Specific incumbents have rotated; the working principle is that GRS holds smaller portfolios than GPS but enough to maintain unity government participation

Constituent Party Presidents (2026, approximate)

• PGRS: Hajiji Noor (founder-president since 2022)
• STAR Sabah: Jeffrey Kitingan (long-time president)
• SAPP: Yong Teck Lee (founder, multiple presidential terms since 1994)
• PBS: Maximus Ongkili (long-time president, succeeded Joseph Pairin Kitingan)
• LDP: Smaller party; presidency held by senior Chinese-Sabah figure
• USNO (revived): Smaller party

Jeffrey Kitingan, A Key GRS Figure

Datuk Seri Panglima Dr. Jeffrey Kitingan is one of the most distinctive figures in Sabah politics:

• Born: 22 January 1949
• Family: Younger brother of Joseph Pairin Kitingan (founder of PBS and former Chief Minister 1985-1994)
• Political journey: Member of multiple parties over decades, PBS, PBRS, STAR Sabah (current vehicle since 2016)
• Federal role: Currently a Deputy Minister in the unity government cabinet
• Signature issues: MA63 implementation, KDM rights, Sabah federalist reform
• Public profile: Known for outspoken pronouncements on Sabah autonomy

Yong Teck Lee, SAPP

Datuk Yong Teck Lee:

• Founded SAPP in 1994
• Former Chief Minister of Sabah (1996-1998 under the BN rotation system)
• Continues as SAPP president and an active GRS figure
• Has emphasised Sabah autonomy and Chinese-Sabah representation

Federal Parliamentary Seats (GRS, approximate)

(Note: published figures vary depending on whether aligned Sabah BN seats are counted within or outside the GRS bloc. The widely cited GRS-only figure is approximately 6 federal seats.)

Sabah State Elections (GRS Era)

Voter turnout: approximately 66.6%, depressed by COVID-19. Next Sabah state election is constitutionally due by approximately late 2025, with the actual date subject to the Chief Minister's recommendation to the Yang di-Pertua Negeri. (As of 2026-05-22, check current state assembly status, the 2025 dissolution and state election may have occurred or be pending.)

Federal Strongholds (Approximate)

GRS-held federal seats span various parts of Sabah:

• PGRS seats, multi-ethnic constituencies in interior and coastal Sabah
• STAR Sabah seats, KDM-majority constituencies (Keningau area, parts of interior)
• SAPP seats, Chinese-mixed urban constituencies
• PBS seats, KDM constituencies

The eight federal seats not in the GRS-Sabah BN orbit went variously to Warisan, DAP (Chinese urban, Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan), PKR and independents.

Opposition in Sabah

The non-GRS forces in Sabah include:

• Warisan (Parti Warisan Sabah), Shafie Apdal's vehicle; primary GRS opponent; KDM and multi-ethnic base
• DAP-Sabah**, Chinese urban seats (Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan, Tawau)
• PKR-Sabah**, Smaller presence; aligned with unity government federally
• UMNO-Sabah / BN-Sabah, Coalition partner of GRS at state level but a separate national coalition

2020 Sabah State Election Breakdown (Approximate)

Within the GRS bloc, the approximate party-by-party allocation was:

• Bersatu Sabah (now PGRS): ~11 seats
• Sabah BN (UMNO Sabah): ~14 seats
• STAR Sabah: ~6 seats
• SAPP: ~2 seats
• PBS: ~3 seats
• LDP: ~2 seats

Sabah Demographic Profile

Sabah's ethnic composition (approximate, based on 2010 Census and updated estimates, exact figures vary by source and methodology):

• Kadazan-Dusun (KDM, including various sub-groups): ~17-18%
• Bajau (including Bajau Laut, Bajau Darat): ~14%
• Malay: ~5-6%
• Murut: ~3-4%
• Chinese: ~9-10%
• Indigenous others (Suluk, Tidong, Rungus, Lundayeh and many smaller groups): ~10-12%
• Non-Malaysian citizens / permanent residents / undocumented: significant but contested proportion (Project IC controversy)
• Indonesian-origin and Filipino-origin Muslim communities: significant, often classified within Malay/Bajau/Suluk categories in census

Sabah is unique in Malaysia for the prominence of indigenous Christian communities (especially KDM) and the complex citizenship politics around immigrant-origin communities.

The Project IC / RCI Issue

The "Project IC" allegation, that identity cards were issued to non-citizens (especially Filipino and Indonesian Muslims) for political reasons in the 1990s, has been a recurring controversy. The Royal Commission of Inquiry on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah (RCI, established 2012 under PM Najib Razak, reported 2014) documented systematic irregularities. The recommendations have been partially implemented; the political legacy remains contested. GRS, Warisan and most Sabah parties have made varying commitments on tightening voter rolls and citizenship verification.

Unity Government Position

GRS holds:

• One or two full ministerial portfolios (composition varies by reshuffle)
• Several deputy ministerial positions
• Federal allocations to Sabah (Pan Borneo, infrastructure, MA63 deliverables)

This gives GRS:

• Federal cabinet voice (smaller than GPS's but real)
• Direct channel to PM via ministerial counterparts
• Federal development funding negotiation power
• Stability of Sabah state government (federal non-interference)

MA63 Implementation Progress (Unity Government Era)

Under the Anwar government, progress on MA63 for Sabah has included:

• Quarterly MA63 Implementation Working Committee meetings
• Increased Sabah representation in federal commissions
• Phased oil royalty discussions (still 5% as of 2025; pushing for 20% jointly with Sarawak)
• Greater state input on education curriculum
• Gas-related agreements (Sabah does not yet have a Petros-equivalent at the same scale, discussions on a Sabah Gas Aggregator concept have been ongoing)
• Restoration of MA63 Special Council mechanisms
• Symbolic and procedural wins

Outstanding fiscal demands (largely unmet):

• 40% net federal revenue share (constitutional provision per MA63)
• 20% petroleum royalty
• Continental shelf jurisdiction
• Full immigration-fee revenue retention

Sabah Maju Jaya Development Plan

Hajiji's signature initiative (announced 2021) aims to transform Sabah across:

1. Infrastructure

• Pan Borneo Highway Sabah portion completion (delayed)
• Rural electrification (Sabah still has the highest rate of unconnected households in Malaysia)
• Water supply expansion
• Telecommunications and 5G rollout

2. Agriculture and Palm Oil Downstream

• Move beyond crude palm oil exports to refined products and oleochemicals
• Rice self-sufficiency initiatives (Sabah is a major Malaysian rice-deficit state)
• Aquaculture expansion

3. Tourism

• Mount Kinabalu (UNESCO World Heritage)
• Sipadan and Mabul Islands (premier dive destinations)
• Sandakan-Kinabatangan (wildlife tourism)
• Cultural tourism (Kadazan-Dusun harvest festival, Bajau Regatta, multi-ethnic heritage)

4. Oil, Gas and Energy

• Continued Petronas operations (LNG complex in Bintulu, Sarawak; some Sabah fields)
• Sabah gas commercialisation (negotiations ongoing)
• Renewable energy (solar potential, some hydro)

5. Digital and Economy

• Sabah Digital Economy Blueprint
• E-commerce enablement for rural producers
• Skilled workforce development

Future Outlook

GRS is positioned for moderate stability but faces real challenges:

Strengths:

• Hajiji's personal credibility as a consensual figure
• Multi-ethnic coalition reflecting Sabah's diversity
• Federal alignment securing development resources
• "Sabah First" identity that resonates locally

Challenges:

• Succession: Hajiji turning 71 in 2026; eventual handover question open
• Coalition coherence: Multiple parties, occasional defections, wobble cycles
• Sabah BN relationship: UMNO Sabah is both partner and rival
• Warisan opposition: Shafie Apdal remains a credible alternative
• Federal allocation disputes: Particularly oil royalty and 40% revenue
• Indigenous and rural development: Sabah lags peninsular states in human development indicators

The Next Sabah State Election

Sabah's state assembly term expires by approximately late 2025. As of the most recent reporting available, dissolution and the actual election date are subject to the Chief Minister's recommendation. The contest is expected to be primarily between:

• GRS (and possibly with Sabah BN coordination, or in friction)
• Warisan (Shafie Apdal)
• PH-Sabah (DAP, PKR, Amanah), possibly in cooperation with Warisan or GRS depending on federal alignment

The outcome will shape Sabah's political trajectory for the second half of the decade.

The 16th General Election (federal, due by November 2027)

Best Case for GRS: Holds or modestly increases its ~6 federal seats; remains a federal coalition partner.

Realistic Case: Holds 5-7 federal seats; coalition arithmetic remains relevant if federal parliament is hung again.

Worst Case: Drops to 3-4 if Warisan or PH gains traction; coalition relevance reduced.

Strategic Direction

GRS will continue:

• Multi-coalition pragmatism federally
• Sabah Maju Jaya implementation
• MA63 implementation push (jointly with GPS)
• State autonomy expansion
• Sabah-first identity politics

The party's "transactional Sabah First" approach gives it tactical flexibility. Whether the unity government, a PN-led alternative or some new configuration emerges in 2027, GRS will aim to be a relevant federal partner.

Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), The Sabah Dimension

MA63 is the inter-governmental treaty signed on 9 July 1963 in Marlborough House, London. The signatories on behalf of North Borneo (Sabah) included Donald Stephens (later Tun Fuad Stephens, who became the first Chief Minister of Sabah). The Federation of Malaysia came into being on 16 September 1963, Malaysia Day.

The agreement entrenched constitutional safeguards for Sabah and Sarawak that distinguish them from peninsular states:

• Immigration autonomy: Sabah controls entry of foreign nationals AND peninsular Malaysians (work-pass / state-issued permit required)
• Land and natural resources: State jurisdiction under Schedule 9 of the Federal Constitution
• Native customary rights (NCR): Recognition of indigenous Kadazan-Dusun, Murut, Bajau, Suluk and other native land claims
• Education and language: State input on curriculum; English retained in state government use
• Religious affairs: No state religion in Sabah (unlike peninsular states); Islamic affairs administered separately by Majlis Ugama Islam Sabah
• Financial arrangements: 40% of net federal revenue derived from Sabah (this provision is the single most disputed MA63 item, Sabah has rarely received the full 40% in practice; the under-implementation is a continuing political grievance)

The 20-Point Memorandum (Sabah)

Before MA63 was finalised, the State of North Borneo presented a 20-Point Memorandum (1962) to the Inter-Governmental Committee chaired by Lord Cobbold. The 20 Points covered:

1. Religion (no state religion in Sabah)
2. Language (English retained for 10 years initially)
3. Constitution (separate Sabah constitution within federal framework)
4. Head of Federation (no objection to a paramount ruler)
5. Name of Federation ("Malaysia")
6. Immigration (state control)
7. Right of Secession (rejected by negotiators, not adopted)
8. Borneanisation (preferring local officers in Sabah public service)
9. British officers (transitional arrangements)
10. Citizenship (recognition of Sabah natives as full citizens)
11. Tariffs and finance (state revenue protections)
12. Special position of indigenous races (native rights affirmed)
13. State government (Sabah's own constitution)
14. Transitional period (gradual integration)
15. Education (state control of certain elements)
16. Constitutional safeguards (entrenched provisions)
17. Representation in federal Parliament (proportionate)
18. Name of head of state ("Yang di-Pertua Negeri")
19. Name of state ("Sabah," changed from "North Borneo")
20. Land, forests, local government (state jurisdiction)

The 20 Points were not enacted as a single legal document but the substance was woven into the Federal Constitution via Annex A of MA63 and into the Cobbold Report and IGC Report 1962.

Article 161A, The Native Protection Clause for Sabah

Article 161A of the Federal Constitution provides special protections for "natives" of Sabah and Sarawak. For Sabah, "native" under Article 161A(6) is defined as a person of any of these races (the list includes): Bajau, Bisaya, Brunei, Bukitan, Dusun, Kadayan, Kalabit, Kayan, Kenyah, Kelabit (and various sub-groups), Lun Bawang, Murut, Sino-native (Eurasian Sino-Kadazan), Suluk, Tidong and others. The list is broader and more inclusive than the peninsular "Malay" definition under Article 160(2).

In practice, Article 161A means a substantial majority of Sabah's population enjoys Bumiputera/native rights regardless of whether they are Muslim, Christian Kadazan-Dusun, Christian Murut and animist-tradition communities all qualify. This contrasts sharply with peninsular Bumiputera definition which is tied to Islam.

The 40% Revenue Provision

Among the most contentious MA63 items is the provision that Sabah should receive 40% of net federal revenue derived from Sabah. The provision is set out in Article 112C and Article 112D of the Federal Constitution (with cross-references to Schedule 10) and the related MA63 schedules. In practice:

• The federal government has historically argued that the 40% provision has been met through various aggregated transfers, grants and revenue-sharing.
• Sabah has argued that the 40% has never been fully implemented in cash terms.
• Periodic Sabah political demands include a comprehensive audit and reconciliation.
• Under the Anwar unity government, MA63 Implementation Working Committee discussions have included the 40% question but no major fiscal restitution has been announced as of 2025-2026.

Petroleum Royalty (5% vs 20%)

Under the Petroleum Development Act 1974, oil-producing states receive 5% cash royalty on petroleum extracted from their territory. Sabah, like Sarawak and Kelantan, has demanded 20%. The 30 September 2022 Federal Court ruling in the Sarawak State Sales Tax case opened a possible parallel path: states can impose sales tax on petroleum products within their territory under State List authority. Sabah has explored similar legal-fiscal approaches.

Continental Shelf Dispute

A long-running constitutional dispute centres on whether Sabah's territorial jurisdiction extends 12 nautical miles offshore (as the federal government argues) or to the full continental shelf (as Sabah and Sarawak argue). The Federal Court in earlier cases has tended toward the federal interpretation; GRS, GPS and successive Sabah/Sarawak state governments continue to contest.

Chief Minister Hajiji's Approach

Hajiji Noor has generally taken a constructive engagement approach to MA63:

• Working through the Implementation Working Committee
• Avoiding public confrontation with Putrajaya
• Banking small wins (representation, symbolic restitution)
• Reserving large fiscal demands (40%, 20% royalty) for continued political pressure

This is in contrast to more vocal Sabah voices (e.g., parts of STAR Sabah under Jeffrey Kitingan, parts of Warisan under Shafie Apdal) who push for faster and more dramatic restitution.

Sabah politics in the 2020s is best understood as a triangular contest among three poles: GRS (Hajiji), Sabah BN/UMNO Sabah (Bung Moktar Radin and successors) and Warisan (Shafie Apdal). The shifting relationships among these three define Sabah's political stability.

Pole 1: GRS (Hajiji Noor)

The state government. PGRS is the dominant constituent, alongside STAR Sabah, SAPP, PBS, LDP and the revived USNO. GRS holds roughly 24 of 73 state seats on its own, excluding the Sabah BN coordination that supplies its working majority, and approximately 6 federal seats. Its leverage is incumbency plus a seat in the Anwar unity government, and its weakness is that the majority is borrowed from a partner it does not control.

Pole 2: Sabah BN / UMNO Sabah

The former hegemon, dominant through the 1990s and 2000s, out of state power since 2018. It sits inside the GRS state government with about 14 of 73 seats, enough to make its exit an existential question for Hajiji, and Bung Moktar Radin held a Deputy Chief Minister post. It backs the Anwar unity government federally on its own account rather than through GRS, which gives it a route to Putrajaya that bypasses the Chief Minister. Sabah UMNO also carries its own tensions with peninsular UMNO over autonomy and candidate selection.

Pole 3: Warisan (Parti Warisan Sabah)

The opposition pole, built by Shafie Apdal (born 24 January 1957 in Semporna, and still party president) as a multi-ethnic vehicle with strong KDM and Muslim-Sabahan support. It governed the state for one term and lost narrowly, taking about 23 of 73 seats with PH allies bringing the opposition bench to roughly 32. It backs the unity government federally, so its opposition is state-level only, which limits how hard it can attack GRS through Putrajaya.

Triangular Dynamics

The three poles interact in shifting patterns:

Scenario 1: GRS + Sabah BN against Warisan (Status Quo 2020-2026)

• Current arrangement at Sabah state level
• Supplies the governing majority, and has survived every wobble so far

Scenario 2: GRS + Warisan against BN (Hypothetical)

• Periodically rumoured following Sabah BN frictions
• Would realign Sabah politics dramatically
• Has not materialised but remains a theoretical possibility

Scenario 3: BN + Warisan against GRS (Hypothetical)

• Less likely given personal political histories (Shafie left UMNO; tensions with Bung Moktar)
• Has been speculated during major wobble cycles
• Not currently active

Scenario 4: Three-Way Contest (Status in Federal Elections)

• GE15 saw all three poles contest separately federally
• GRS, BN-Sabah and Warisan each won a portion of Sabah's 25 federal seats
• The fragmentation produced no dominant Sabah federal coalition

The 2025 State Election Question

As Sabah approaches its next state election (constitutionally due by late 2025), the triangular geometry will be tested:

• Will GRS and Sabah BN contest as allies again (a "Sabah unity government" model)?
• Will Warisan contest independently or with PH allies (DAP, PKR, Amanah-Sabah)?
• Will GRS face internal contests (especially PGRS vs other constituents over candidate slates)?
• Will federal-level coalition arrangements (PH-BN-GPS-GRS) translate into state-level cooperation?

The early signals from 2024-2025 suggested a complex contest with multiple possible scenarios, but the final shape is being determined in real-time.

The Wobble Cycles

Since September 2020 the Sabah state government has been through a recurring cycle of defection rumours, no-confidence threats and constitutional questions:

• Late 2022: speculation about a GRS-BN realignment following GE15
• 2023: reported tensions between PGRS and Sabah BN over portfolio allocation
• 2024: defection rumours from individual MLAs, and constitutional questions
• 2025: pre-election positioning

Alongside these, the state government has carried recurring flood disasters (notably 2022, 2023 and 2024) and federal-state coordination on MA63 deliverables.

These share one mechanic. GRS governs on a majority it borrows from Sabah BN, so any portfolio dispute, defection rumour or federal realignment immediately becomes a question about whether the state government survives. Each has been settled by Hajiji's personal coalition management rather than by a structural fix, which is why the same argument returns in a new form every year or so. The contrast with Sarawak is the point: GPS holds 76 of 82 state seats and has no equivalent pressure point.

Sabah has had 16 Chief Ministers since joining Malaysia, and Hajiji Noor is the 16th. The turnover itself is the story. Sarawak has been governed by a handful of long-serving leaders; Sabah has churned through interim appointments, an engineered rotation, a fatal air crash and two changes of government in three years.

The men and their bases

The office has passed across every major community in the state, and rarely by design. Tun Fuad Stephens was a KDM leader and a key MA63 negotiator, the man who wrote Sabah's terms and then held the job for barely a year. Peter Lo Sui Yin (1 January 1965 to 12 May 1967) came from the Sabah Chinese Association, allied to USNO. Tun Mustapha Harun (12 May 1967 to 31 October 1975), the USNO founder and a Bajau-Suluk leader with ties to the independent Philippines and Indonesia, was the dominant Sabah figure of his era and used the office to drive a rapid Islamisation and Malayisation of the state administration. He resigned amid mounting controversy. Mohammad Said Keruak (1 November 1975 to 18 April 1976) filled the gap between Mustapha and Harris Salleh. Harris Salleh (18 April 1976 to 22 April 1985), the Berjaya founder, presided over Sabah's economic modernisation and had become unpopular by the mid-1980s. Osu Sukam (1999 to 2001) presided over a period of Sabah BN consolidation. Chong Kah Kiat of the LDP (2001 to 2003) had a brief Chinese-Malaysian turn. Musa Aman, brother of foreign minister Anifah Aman, was the BN era's fixture at over 15 years, and left office in 2018 following the BN defeat. Shafie Apdal, a Bajau leader from Semporna and a former UMNO Vice-President, built his own vehicle after leaving the party. Hajiji, a Bajau-Suluk leader from Tuaran, chaired Bersatu Sabah before founding PGRS in 2022, and remains GRS chairman.

The Double Six

Tun Fuad Stephens led Berjaya back to power in 1976 and died in the Double Six air crash on 6 June 1976, weeks into a second term. Harris Salleh succeeded him. The crash removed Sabah's founding negotiator at the moment he had regained the authority to press MA63 claims, and it is still argued over in the state on those terms.

The midnight wait and the rotation

Joseph Pairin Kitingan's PBS victory over Berjaya was followed by a long midnight wait before he was allowed to take the oath, an episode Sabahans still cite when federal intentions toward the state are questioned. He stayed a major figure for decades. What ended him was BN's re-engineering of the state assembly after PBS left the coalition. The rotation system that followed handed the office to the Muslim, KDM and Chinese blocs in turn on a fixed clock, through Sakaran Dandai, Salleh Said Keruak, Yong Teck Lee and Bernard Dompok. It was meant to guarantee every community a share. In practice it guaranteed that no Chief Minister could build anything, since each knew his term was capped, and it was abandoned within five years.

Notes on Numbering

Different sources count Sabah's Chief Ministers differently. Some count Tun Fuad Stephens' two terms as separate entries, which makes Hajiji the 17th; others treat the rotation appointees variably; interim and acting appointments are handled inconsistently. The 16-count used here is one common rendering. The substantive history matters more than the precise numbering.

Yang di-Pertua Negeri (Governors) of Sabah

The Sabah head of state (constitutional monarch-equivalent) is the Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah, appointed for renewable four-year terms by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the advice of the Sabah state government. Notable holders include Tun Fuad Stephens (1973-1975, before becoming Chief Minister again) and more recently Tun Juhar Mahiruddin (long-serving Governor through the 2020 dissolution). The current Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah as of 2026 should be verified against official records.

Sabah's political distinctiveness is rooted in its extraordinary indigenous diversity. Sabah has over 30 recognised indigenous groups, plus significant non-indigenous communities, making it the most ethnically diverse state in Malaysia.

Kadazan-Dusun-Murut (KDM), Indigenous Christian-Majority Bloc

The "KDM" grouping covers three closely-related but distinct indigenous communities:

• Kadazan, predominantly coastal and lowland; approximately 8-10% of Sabah population; Penampang-Papar-Putatan core
• Dusun, predominantly interior and highland; approximately 8-10% of Sabah population; Tambunan-Ranau-Kota Marudu core
• Murut, interior southern Sabah; approximately 3-4% of Sabah population; Tenom-Keningau-Nabawan-Pensiangan core

Combined KDM population: approximately 19-22% of Sabah, a significant bloc but not a majority. Religious composition: predominantly Christian (Catholic and various Protestant denominations) with substantial animist-traditional and Muslim minorities (Muslim Kadazan and Muslim Dusun communities exist).

KDM political representation is distributed across:

• PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah), historically the primary KDM Christian political vehicle since 1985 (Joseph Pairin Kitingan)
• STAR Sabah, Jeffrey Kitingan's vehicle (Joseph Pairin's younger brother)
• Upko (United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation), KDM-focused; aligned with Warisan/PH at various points
• Warisan, significant KDM membership
• PGRS, SAPP and others, KDM members across multiple parties

The Kadazan-Dusun cultural movement (notably the Kaamatan harvest festival, celebrated 30-31 May annually) is a key cultural anchor for KDM political identity.

Bajau, Coastal Muslim Community

The Bajau (sometimes called Bajau Laut for the sea-dwelling sub-group, Bajau Darat for land-dwelling) form approximately 14% of Sabah's population, predominantly Muslim. Concentrated in:

• West Coast Bajau, Kota Belud area
• East Coast Bajau, Semporna, Lahad Datu, Kunak, Sandakan

Politically, Bajau community is split across multiple parties:

• UMNO Sabah, historical major Bajau political vehicle
• PGRS / Bersatu Sabah, Hajiji Noor is Bajau-Suluk
• Warisan, Shafie Apdal is Bajau (Semporna)
• USNO (revived), historical home

The Bajau vote is critical for any Sabah-Muslim political vehicle.

Murut, Southern Sabah Interior

The Murut (approximately 3-4%) are concentrated in the southern interior, Tenom, Keningau, Nabawan and Pensiangan. Historically warrior peoples; now a substantial part of the KDM Christian electoral bloc. Politically represented within PBS, STAR Sabah and other KDM-friendly parties. Murut concerns: native land rights, infrastructure, education access.

Suluk, Sulu-Origin Muslim Community

The Suluk community (originally from the Sulu Archipelago, now southern Philippines) has a significant presence in eastern Sabah (Sandakan, Tawau, Semporna). Religious composition: Muslim. Hajiji Noor is partly Suluk. The Suluk vote intersects with broader Sabah-Muslim politics.

Chinese-Sabah

Sabah Chinese form approximately 9-10% of the population, concentrated in:

• Kota Kinabalu (Hakka and various)
• Sandakan (Hokkien and Hakka)
• Tawau (Hakka)
• Sibuga, Kudat, Beaufort

Politically split between:

• SAPP (GRS), Yong Teck Lee's vehicle since 1994; multi-ethnic but Chinese-prominent
• LDP (GRS), Chinese-focused; smaller
• DAP-Sabah, strong in urban Chinese areas (KK, Sandakan)
• MCA-Sabah, minimal presence

The Chinese vote in Sabah is highly contested in urban constituencies.

Other Indigenous Groups

Sabah recognises many smaller indigenous groups, each with distinct languages and traditions:

• Rungus, northern Sabah (Kudat)
• Lundayeh / Lun Bawang, interior Sabah, also in Sarawak and Indonesian Kalimantan
• Bisaya, Beaufort area (also in Sarawak)
• Tidong, Tawau-Tarakan area (also in Indonesian Kalimantan)
• Iranun, coastal western Sabah
• Idahan, Lahad Datu area
• Many others, Sabah's indigenous diversity is exceptional

Political representation for smaller groups typically operates through KDM-umbrella parties (PBS, STAR, Upko) or through individual MLA candidacies within larger coalitions.

Indonesian-Origin and Filipino-Origin Communities

Sabah has significant communities tracing origins to:

• Indonesian Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Java, Sumatra, migration over decades for plantation and construction work
• Southern Philippines (Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi), long-standing communities plus more recent migration

The political status of these communities is complex. Some are full citizens (sometimes via irregular processes alleged in the RCI on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah report 2014), some hold permanent residency, others are undocumented. Voter rolls have been repeatedly contested. GRS, like all Sabah parties, must navigate this terrain carefully.

Pan Borneo Highway Sabah Portion

The Sabah portion of the Pan Borneo Highway (PBH) is approximately 1,023 km, linking Sindumin (Sarawak border) through Beaufort, Papar, Kota Kinabalu, Tuaran, Kota Belud, Kudat, Ranau, Sandakan, Lahad Datu, Tawau and onward to Kalabakan. Status:

• Phase 1: Major sections under construction with multiple contract packages
• Cost: Federal allocations have exceeded RM 12-15 billion for the Sabah portion alone, with revised totals climbing higher
• Progress: As of 2024-2025, Sabah PBH completion lagged the Sarawak portion. Major delays attributed to terrain, land acquisition, contractor disputes and COVID-19 disruption.
• Politics: PBH delivery is one of Hajiji's key talking points with Putrajaya. Fadillah Yusof (DPM, former Works Minister) is a key federal counterpart.

Federal Development Allocations to Sabah

Under the Anwar unity government (2022+), federal development allocations to Sabah have ranged in the multi-billion ringgit band annually (precise figures vary by Budget cycle and exclude statutory transfers and Petronas-related flows). Allocation has covered:

• Pan Borneo Highway
• Rural electrification (Sabah has the highest rate of unconnected households in Malaysia, Bornoe Power Sdn Bhd and Sabah Electricity Sdn Bhd serve scattered rural communities)
• Water supply (Sabah Water Department serves limited coverage; rural water access is patchy)
• Healthcare (Queen Elizabeth Hospital KK, Hospital Tawau and Hospital Sandakan are key tertiary centres; rural clinics are sparse)
• Education (Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Politeknik Kota Kinabalu and other tertiary institutions)
• Telecommunications and 5G

GRS has consistently argued these allocations remain inadequate relative to Sabah's population (approximately 3.4 million) and its underdevelopment relative to peninsular states.

Sabah State Revenue and the 40% Question

The constitutional provision that Sabah receive 40% of net federal revenue derived from Sabah is the single most disputed MA63 item. Practical state revenue sources include:

• Federal grants under Article 110-112C
• State sales tax (Sabah has not yet implemented a petroleum-products state sales tax comparable to Sarawak's 5%, discussions are ongoing)
• Land premium and rent
• Forest royalties and timber revenue
• Petroleum royalty (5% under PDA 1974)
• State enterprise dividends (e.g., Sabah Development Corporation entities)

Total annual Sabah state government revenue is in the low-single-digit billions of ringgit, far less than would be implied by the 40% provision.

Kota Kinabalu International Airport

KK International (KKIA) handles approximately 8-9 million passengers annually (pre-COVID; recovery trajectory by 2024-2025). Major routes to Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo, Shenzhen and others. Sabah has periodically lobbied for KKIA expansion and second-runway studies.

Sandakan, Tawau and Other Airports

Sabah has multiple commercial airports, Sandakan, Tawau, Lahad Datu, Mulu (linked via Sarawak), Labuan, plus over 20 rural STOL airstrips served by MASwings. Rural air connectivity is essential for interior Sabah communities.

Ports

Sabah ports include Kota Kinabalu Port, Sandakan Port, Tawau Port and others. Sapangar Bay Container Port (KK area) is the principal container facility. The Sabah Ports Authority operates several facilities; expansion has been a continuing political objective.

Sabah Oil and Gas

Sabah hosts significant petroleum operations:

• Offshore Sabah, oil and gas fields operated by Petronas Carigali and various international partners (Shell, ExxonMobil, others in some periods)
• Sabah Oil and Gas Terminal (SOGT), at Kimanis (Papar district)
• Kimanis Power Plant, gas-fired electricity generation
• Sabah Ammonia Urea (SAMUR), petrochemical complex

Sabah has long sought to develop downstream petrochemical industry rather than exporting raw gas. The Sabah Gas Aggregator concept (modelled on Sarawak's Petros) has been discussed but not implemented at the same scale as of 2025-2026.

Renewable Energy

Sabah has substantial renewable energy potential:

• Solar, high insolation; rooftop and utility-scale projects expanding
• Hydro, limited large-scale; some small hydro on interior rivers
• Biomass, palm oil mill effluent and empty fruit bunch utilisation
• Wind, limited

The Sabah state government has signalled interest in becoming a renewable energy exporter to Kalimantan (Indonesia's relocating capital city Nusantara is just across the border) but firm projects remain at planning stage.

Tourism Infrastructure

Sabah's tourism sector is among Malaysia's most developed:

• Mount Kinabalu (4,095 m; UNESCO World Heritage)
• Sipadan Island (premier dive destination; permits limited to 178/day)
• Tunku Abdul Rahman Marine Park (off KK)
• Sandakan-Kinabatangan (wildlife: orangutan, proboscis monkey, pygmy elephant)
• Mulu-Mulu (across to Sarawak)
• Cultural tourism (Kadazan Kaamatan, multi-ethnic festivals)

Tourism revenue is a major Sabah economic pillar; recovery from COVID-19 has been a key 2022-2025 priority.

GRS is a coalition, not a single party, and its constituents have shifting alliances, occasional defections and visible friction. GRS has been noticeably less coherent than GPS in Sarawak.

PGRS, Hajiji's Personal Vehicle

PGRS (Parti Gagasan Rakyat Sabah) was founded in 2022 by Hajiji Noor and a mass of former Bersatu Sabah members after disputes with peninsular Bersatu leadership. PGRS is widely understood as Hajiji's personal political vehicle and is the dominant GRS constituent.

Internal PGRS dynamics:

• Strong Hajiji-aligned core
• Multiple Bajau-Suluk Muslim leaders
• KDM and Chinese members in supporting roles
• Succession question (post-Hajiji) is an open internal matter
• Party formation precise registration details should be verified against the Registrar of Societies

STAR Sabah, Jeffrey Kitingan

STAR Sabah (Parti Solidariti Tanah Airku) was originally a Sarawak-based party that Jeffrey Kitingan adopted as his Sabah vehicle in 2016 after various party transitions. Internal dynamics:

• Personal vehicle for Jeffrey Kitingan
• KDM (especially Kadazan-Dusun) base
• Strong MA63 advocacy stance
• Multiple state assembly seats won in 2020
• Federal Deputy Minister role for Jeffrey in unity government

SAPP, Yong Teck Lee

SAPP (Sabah Progressive Party) was founded 1994 by Yong Teck Lee. Internal dynamics:

• Personal political legacy of Yong Teck Lee (former CM 1996-1998)
• Multi-ethnic but Chinese-Sabahan prominent
• Sabah autonomy emphasis
• Smaller state assembly representation
• Yong's age and eventual succession question

PBS, Maximus Ongkili

PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah) is the historic KDM Christian political vehicle, founded 5 March 1985 by Joseph Pairin Kitingan. Internal dynamics:

• Founder Joseph Pairin Kitingan retired from active politics; died 6 December 2021
• Maximus Ongkili (long-time deputy president, multiple federal cabinet positions) succeeded
• Internal succession after Maximus is an open question
• PBS state seat representation has declined from 1980s peak
• Brand strength remains in KDM Christian areas

LDP and USNO (revived)

Smaller constituents:

• LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), Chinese-Sabah base, smaller; senior leadership succession ongoing
• USNO (revived), historical Sabah Malay-Muslim party in modernised form; limited current state-level representation

Inter-Party Friction

Public friction among GRS constituents has been more visible than in GPS:

• 2020-2021: Initial coalition-formation tensions over candidate allocation
• 2022 PGRS formation: Major restructuring as Bersatu Sabah effectively transformed into PGRS
• 2023-2025: Periodic reports of:
• PGRS vs Sabah BN portfolio disputes (state cabinet)
• PBS-STAR competition for KDM voter base
• SAPP grievances over coalition seat allocation
• Internal succession positioning across constituents

Sabah BN, The Partner That Isn't

UMNO Sabah / Sabah BN is the most complex GRS relationship:

• Technically a separate coalition (BN), not part of GRS
• But works in coordination with GRS at state level
• Bung Moktar Radin (Sabah UMNO chief) has been Deputy Chief Minister
• Federal alignment: both GRS and BN are in unity government, but as distinct entities
• Periodic threats of realignment, withdrawal, or confidence votes

Bersatu Sabah Question

After 2022, the status of "Bersatu Sabah" became contested:

• Hajiji and most members defected to PGRS
• Peninsular Bersatu (under Muhyiddin) retains some residual Sabah presence
• Whether peninsular Bersatu remains in GRS, or has been excluded, is variably reported

Coordination Mechanism

GRS lacks a heavily institutionalised secretariat. Coordination occurs primarily through:

• Hajiji's personal engagement with constituent leaders
• Sabah state cabinet meetings
• Periodic GRS Supreme Council meetings
• Bilateral discussions on specific issues

This is more informal than GPS's established coordination mechanisms, a structural reason for GRS's greater internal volatility.

Sabah's relationship with Anwar Ibrahim's unity government since 24 November 2022 has been a defining feature of the current Malaysian political settlement, though less central than Sarawak's.

The November 2022 Decision

After GE15 on 19 November 2022 produced a hung parliament, GRS held approximately 6 federal seats, small in absolute terms but part of a critical East Malaysian bloc (GPS 23 + GRS ~6 + Warisan 3 = ~32 seats). The Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Sultan Abdullah of Pahang) summoned coalition leaders 22-23 November. After internal deliberation, GRS formally backed Anwar's unity government bid. Anwar was sworn in as 10th Prime Minister on 24 November 2022.

Cabinet Seats Held by GRS (as of 2026)

GRS holds:

• One full ministerial portfolio (composition has varied across reshuffles, has included Entrepreneur Development and Cooperatives or similar economic portfolios)
• Several Deputy Minister positions distributed across portfolios such as Energy Transition, Rural Development, Tourism, Plantation, Higher Education
• Smaller federal footprint than GPS but meaningful access

Policy Wins Under Anwar Government

1. MA63 Implementation Working Committee, quarterly meetings continuing
2. Federal allocations to Sabah, multi-billion ringgit floor maintained
3. Pan Borneo Highway Sabah delivery, accelerated under unity government (with continuing delays)
4. Symbolic and procedural restitutions, increased state representation in federal commissions
5. Sabah Day (31 August), increased federal recognition
6. Education and language, phased return of Sabah-specific elements

Outstanding Demands

• 40% net federal revenue (constitutional provision per MA63), largely unmet
• 20% petroleum royalty (vs 5% statutory), federal government has not agreed
• Continental shelf jurisdiction, disputed
• Full immigration-fee revenue retention, partial implementation
• Project IC follow-through, RCI recommendations partially implemented

The "Sabah First" Discipline

GRS has generally been disciplined in not openly antagonising the unity government, though less consistently than GPS. Public friction has been confined to specific issues (e.g., flood relief allocations, federal scholarship distribution, immigration enforcement) rather than coalition-level breaks. Hajiji has personally maintained working relations with Anwar; federal cabinet counterparts operate the day-to-day Sabah channel.

Risk Scenarios

• If Anwar government collapses (no-confidence motion, defections, royal intervention), GRS would likely pivot to whichever coalition can offer better Sabah terms. The 2020 PN alignment precedent shows GRS's flexibility.
• If Hajiji's personal position weakens (PGRS internal challenge, health, electoral defeat), the Sabah channel would degrade.
• If state-level wobbles escalate (Sabah BN defection, Warisan growth), state-federal coordination could fracture.

The Sabah-Putrajaya equilibrium under Anwar is best described as conditional cooperation, each side gets enough to keep the arrangement alive, neither side gets full satisfaction.

Comparison with Sarawak (GPS)

GRS's unity-government relationship is similar in structure to GPS's but smaller in scale:

Both are essential to unity government majority arithmetic; GPS is structurally more important; GRS is structurally more volatile.

GRS's political trajectory has been substantially shaped by, and has in turn shaped, a series of legal-constitutional milestones around Sabah's status. Selected milestones:

29 July 2020, Dissolution of the Sabah State Legislative Assembly

Following former CM Musa Aman's claim to have assembled a majority, then-CM Shafie Apdal advised the Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah to dissolve the state assembly. The dissolution was granted. The constitutional question, whether the Yang di-Pertua Negeri was bound to accept the advice given the competing majority claim, became a subject of academic and political debate. The dissolution stood, triggering the 26 September 2020 snap election.

Federal Court, 30 September 2022, *Petroliam Nasional Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak*

Though a Sarawak case, the ruling has direct implications for Sabah. The Federal Court affirmed Sarawak's constitutional authority to impose State Sales Tax on petroleum products under the State List. Sabah has explored similar legal-fiscal approaches, though as of 2025-2026 has not yet implemented an equivalent petroleum-products state sales tax at the same scale.

RCI on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah (2012-2014)

The Royal Commission of Inquiry on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah was established by the Najib government in 2012 and reported in 2014. Key findings:

• Systematic irregularities in citizenship issuance in Sabah, particularly during the 1990s
• The "Project IC" allegation was largely substantiated
• Recommendations included voter roll cleansing, citizenship review processes, and immigration enforcement
• Implementation of recommendations has been partial and politically contested

The RCI report remains a touchstone in Sabah political debate, particularly during state elections.

Native Customary Rights Cases

A series of Sabah court rulings have addressed Native Customary Rights (NCR) claims of Kadazan-Dusun, Murut and other indigenous communities. Major cases have included disputes over:

• Forest reserves and logging concessions
• Plantation development on customary land
• Sipitang and other coastal NCR claims
• Hydropower-related land disputes (less prominent in Sabah than Sarawak)

Sabah High Court rulings have generally been mixed, some pro-native, some pro-development, and many cases have been appealed to the Court of Appeal and Federal Court.

The 2019 Constitutional Amendment (Failed) and 2021 Amendment (Passed)

The April 2019 amendment to restore Article 1(2) wording (listing Sabah, Sarawak and Malaya as three equal entities) failed (short by 10 votes), partly because GRS's predecessor Sabah parties were divided. The December 2021 amendment under the Ismail Sabri government passed with broader East Malaysian support including GRS.

Sabah State Sales Tax, Exploration

Sabah has periodically discussed imposing a state sales tax on petroleum products, modelled on Sarawak's 2018 amendment (which was upheld by the Federal Court in 2022). As of 2025-2026, Sabah has not implemented such a tax at the full Sarawak-equivalent scale, though preliminary legislation and federal-state discussions have been reported.

Continental Shelf Litigation

The constitutional dispute over Sabah's territorial jurisdiction offshore, 12 nautical miles (federal position) vs full continental shelf (state position), has been litigated in various forms. The Federal Court has tended toward the federal interpretation. GRS continues to contest, jointly with GPS.

Citizenship and Voter Roll Litigation

Multiple election petitions in Sabah have raised questions about voter roll accuracy and citizenship status. The pattern has been: contested petitions, some procedural rulings, but limited substantive change to overall voter rolls. The Sabah Election Commission and the federal Election Commission have coordinated on voter roll maintenance, but the underlying political contestation continues.

Sulu Sultanate Compensation Claim, 2022-2024

A high-profile international arbitration matter, related to but separate from GRS politics: heirs of the former Sultanate of Sulu sought a USD 14.92 billion award against Malaysia in connection with disputed Sabah revenue. A French arbitration tribunal made a controversial award in 2022; Malaysia has contested in multiple jurisdictions. The matter is ongoing as of 2025-2026. While not a GRS-specific issue, it intersects with Sabah's historical territorial status and is a recurring topic in Sabah political discourse.

Going Forward

GRS legal strategy continues to push the boundaries of state authority on:

• Petroleum exploration licensing (currently federal under PDA 1974)
• State sales tax on petroleum products (Sarawak model)
• Continental shelf jurisdiction (disputed)
• Foreign worker quotas (state immigration authority)
• Education curriculum (concurrent list disputes)
• Voter roll integrity (RCI follow-through)

Like GPS, GRS's approach is generally patient, incremental and constitutional rather than confrontational, though with somewhat more variation across constituents (Jeffrey Kitingan's STAR Sabah is more vocal; PGRS tends toward quieter negotiation).