GRS

Coalition Formed: 9 September 2020, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. Multi-party electoral umbrella assembled just three weeks before the snap Sabah state election of 26 September 2020.

Status (2026): Governs the Sabah state government with Hajiji Noor as the 16th Chief Minister of Sabah. Holds approximately 6 federal seats. Component of Anwar Ibrahim's unity government at federal level since 24 November 2022.

Power Period: Continuous control of the Sabah state government since 29 September 2020. First federal coalition partner role: November 2022 unity government with PH-BN-GPS-Warisan.

Membership: GRS is a coalition; constituent parties have separate memberships. PGRS (founded 2022 by Hajiji) is the dominant constituent. Total combined membership across constituent parties is reported in the low hundreds of thousands but precise figures are not consistently published.

Key Distinguishing Features: - Sabah-only coalition (does not contest peninsular) - Multi-ethnic by necessity — Sabah has the most diverse demographic mix in Malaysia (Kadazan-Dusun, Bajau, Murut, Suluk, Malay, Chinese, Bugis-origin communities) - Looser internal coherence than GPS in Sarawak — multiple parties, occasional defections - "Sabah First" (Sabah Maju Jaya) orientation - Pragmatic federal alignment — supported PN, then unity government - Sabah Chief Minister title retained (no "Premier" retitling unlike Sarawak)

Headquarters: Kota Kinabalu, Sabah (multiple constituent-party offices; coordination via Chief Minister's Department).

Symbol and Colours: GRS branding uses orange and blue prominently; constituent parties retain their individual logos for election purposes.

Constituent Parties (2026, approximate — composition has shifted): 1. PGRS (Parti Gagasan Rakyat Sabah) — founded 2022 by Hajiji Noor and former Bersatu Sabah members; dominant GRS constituent 2. STAR Sabah (Parti Solidariti Tanah Airku Sabah) — led by Jeffrey Kitingan; Kadazan-Dusun-Murut (KDM) base 3. SAPP (Sabah Progressive Party) — led by Yong Teck Lee; Chinese-Malaysian and mixed Sabah-nationalist base; founded 1994 4. PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah) — led by Maximus Ongkili (long-time party president); KDM and multi-ethnic base; founded 1985 5. LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) — Chinese-Malaysian base; smaller party 6. USNO (United Sabah National Organisation) — revived in modern form; historical Sabah Malay-Muslim party originally founded 1961

Chief Minister of Sabah: Hajiji Noor — Chairman of GRS and 16th Chief Minister of Sabah since 29 September 2020.

Note on Sabah BN (UMNO Sabah): Often spoken of in the same breath as GRS but technically a separate coalition. Sabah BN MLAs supported the GRS state government from 2020 onwards. Bung Moktar Radin (UMNO Sabah leader) served as a Deputy Chief Minister. Relations have wobbled multiple times but the working arrangement has endured.

Note on Bersatu Sabah: Originally a central GRS pillar in 2020. After 2022 disputes with peninsular Bersatu leadership, Hajiji and most Bersatu Sabah members defected to form PGRS. The status of any residual Bersatu Sabah within GRS is unclear and disputed.

Pre-2018 Sabah Political Context

For decades, Sabah politics was dominated by a series of overlapping parties and coalitions:

• USNO (United Sabah National Organisation) — founded 1961 by Tun Mustapha Harun; dominated 1960s-1970s
• Berjaya — formed 1975 to displace USNO; ruled 1976-1985
• PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah) — founded 5 March 1985 by Joseph Pairin Kitingan; defeated Berjaya in the dramatic 1985 state election
• BN-Sabah era — PBS joined and later left BN; UMNO entered Sabah in 1991 and became dominant
• 2018: Warisan (Parti Warisan Sabah, founded 2016 by Shafie Apdal after he left UMNO) won the 14th state election in Sabah on 9 May 2018 and formed the state government with PH allies; Shafie Apdal became the 15th Chief Minister of Sabah.

The 2020 Sabah Political Crisis (June-July 2020)

Following the Sheraton Move in peninsular Malaysia (February 2020) which brought down the federal PH government, parallel destabilisation reached Sabah:

• 29 July 2020: Former Chief Minister Musa Aman (UMNO) declared he had the support of a majority of Sabah state assembly members and would form a new state government. Reports cited a list of 33 assemblymen signing statutory declarations of support.
• Same day, 29 July 2020: Chief Minister Shafie Apdal pre-empted the takeover by advising the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Sabah (Tun Juhar Mahiruddin) to dissolve the Sabah state legislative assembly.
• The dissolution was granted, voiding the Musa Aman claim and triggering a snap state election.
• Sabah Election Commission set polling for 26 September 2020.

9 September 2020 — Formation of GRS

With approximately three weeks to the polls, opposition forces needed an electoral vehicle. The federal Perikatan Nasional (PN) government under Muhyiddin Yassin (formed via the Sheraton Move) coordinated a multi-party alliance in Sabah:

• Bersatu Sabah (Hajiji Noor) — newly active in Sabah after Muhyiddin's PN rise
• STAR Sabah (Jeffrey Kitingan)
• SAPP (Yong Teck Lee)
• PBS (Maximus Ongkili)
• LDP
• USNO (revived)
• Plus electoral coordination with Sabah BN (UMNO Sabah) under Bung Moktar Radin

GRS was formally announced in Kota Kinabalu on 9 September 2020 as a joint umbrella. The branding emphasised "Rakyat Sabah" (Sabah People) to signal local rootedness despite the peninsular PN linkage.

26 September 2020 — Sabah State Election

The 16th Sabah state election produced a narrow GRS-aligned majority:

Voter turnout was approximately 66.6% — depressed by COVID-19 anxieties. The election was followed by a major COVID-19 outbreak in Sabah, with election-related travel and campaigning contributing to a sharp caseload spike. By October-November 2020, Sabah cases were driving national totals upward and led to renewed restrictions across Malaysia.

29 September 2020 — Hajiji Noor Sworn In

Three days after the vote, Datuk Seri Panglima Haji Hajiji Noor was sworn in as the 16th Chief Minister of Sabah at Istana Negeri Sabah. He was 65 years old. His first cabinet included representatives from across the GRS constituents plus Sabah BN — including Bung Moktar Radin (UMNO Sabah) as a Deputy Chief Minister.

2020-2022 — PN Federal Alignment

GRS aligned with the federal PN government under Muhyiddin (March 2020 to August 2021) and later under Ismail Sabri (BN-led, August 2021 to November 2022). Federal-state relations during this period focused on: - COVID-19 response and vaccination rollout - MA63 implementation working committee (begun under PN; continued under unity government) - Pan Borneo Highway Sabah portion (ongoing delays) - Sabah revenue and 40% claim (no substantive progress)

2022 — The Bersatu-Sabah Split and PGRS Formation

A major internal restructuring occurred in 2022. Disputes between Hajiji Noor (then Bersatu Sabah chairman) and peninsular Bersatu leadership under Muhyiddin Yassin over candidate selection, party direction and Sabah autonomy led Hajiji to lead a mass defection. He formed a new locally-rooted party: Parti Gagasan Rakyat Sabah (PGRS) — registered in 2022. Most Bersatu Sabah members and elected representatives followed Hajiji into PGRS. The exact registration date and full founding circumstances of PGRS should be verified against Registrar of Societies records; the political effect was that PGRS replaced Bersatu Sabah as the dominant GRS constituent.

November 2022 — Unity Government Era

GE15 produced a hung federal parliament. GRS, after consultations with the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and internal deliberation, backed Anwar Ibrahim's unity government bid on 24 November 2022. GRS leaders received federal cabinet and deputy-minister portfolios.

2023-2026 — Wobble Cycles

The Sabah state government has experienced multiple "wobble cycles" since 2020 — periodic rumours of defection, no-confidence threats, and constitutional questions:

• Occasional disputes between PGRS and Sabah BN over portfolio allocation
• Defection rumours from individual MLAs
• Federal-state coordination on MA63 deliverables
• Sabah's response to flood disasters (notably 2022, 2023, 2024)

Hajiji has navigated each wobble and retained the Chief Minister position into 2026.

1. Sabah Maju Jaya / Sabah First

GRS's defining ideological frame. Sabah's interests are prioritised within the Malaysian federation. Specific positions:

MA63 Implementation: - Full restoration of MA63 entitlements (immigration control, religious affairs, native rights) - Push for the 40% federal revenue share provision (long unmet) - Petroleum royalty increase (5% to 20% — joint demand with Sarawak/GPS) - Education curriculum input - Sabah-specific public service quota and Borneanisation

Sabah Maju Jaya Development Plan: - Hajiji's signature development blueprint (announced 2021) - Targets economic transformation by 2025-2030 - Pillars: infrastructure (Pan Borneo Highway), tourism, palm oil downstream, gas industry, agriculture, digital economy - Implementation has been mixed — major infrastructure projects continue with federal allocations

2. Multi-Ethnic Coalition Composition

Sabah's ethnic diversity is the most complex in Malaysia, and GRS's coalition structure reflects (imperfectly) this diversity:

This patchwork reflects Sabah's genuine diversity but also exposes coordination challenges — GRS lacks a single dominant party comparable to PBB in GPS.

3. Pragmatic Federal Alignment

GRS does not strongly adhere to peninsular ideological labels: - Aligned with PN under Muhyiddin (2020-2021) - Aligned with BN-led federal government under Ismail Sabri (2021-2022) - Currently aligned with PH-led unity government under Anwar (2022+) - Will likely align with whichever peninsular coalition best serves Sabah interests in future

4. Economic and Social Outlook

GRS economic policy emphasises: - Resource sovereignty: oil, gas, palm oil, timber — increased state share of revenue - Tourism: Mount Kinabalu, Sipadan, Tunku Abdul Rahman Marine Park, Sandakan - Agriculture and palm oil: downstream processing within Sabah rather than raw exports - Infrastructure catch-up: Pan Borneo Highway, rural electrification, water supply - Digital and connectivity: 5G rollout, undersea cable links

Socially: - Moderate-conservative - Religiously plural — Sabah has the highest Christian population proportion in Malaysia (approximately 26-27%) alongside Muslim majority (approximately 65%) and other faiths - More tolerant of religious pluralism than peninsular Bumiputera politics

5. Religious Position

Unlike peninsular UMNO or PAS, GRS is religiously plural by necessity: - Sabah has approximately 26-27% Christian population (mostly KDM and Chinese) - Approximately 65% Muslim population (Malay, Bajau, Suluk, Bugis-origin, Indonesian-origin) - Other faiths and indigenous animist traditions - Less aggressive Islamic-state advocacy - Practical protection of religious freedom

6. Foreign Worker and Immigration Politics

Sabah's immigration politics are uniquely fraught due to: - Long history of irregular migration from Philippines (Suluk, Bajau) and Indonesia - The "Project IC" controversy (allegations of irregular citizenship issuance dating to the 1990s) - The RCI on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah (Royal Commission, 2012-2014) which documented systematic irregularities - Continuing political contestation over voter rolls and demographic balance

GRS, like all Sabah-based parties, must navigate this terrain carefully — promising tighter border controls while not alienating long-established immigrant-origin communities.

Chairman (GRS) and Chief Minister of Sabah: Hajiji Noor

• Full title: Datuk Seri Panglima Haji Hajiji bin Haji Mohd Noor
• Born: 1 June 1955, Tuaran, Sabah
• Ethnic background: Bajau-Suluk Muslim
• State assembly seat: Sulaman (Tuaran district)
• Political career:
• - Long-time Sabah BN/UMNO member before joining Bersatu Sabah
• - Bersatu Sabah chairman (until 2022 split)
• - Founded PGRS in 2022
• - 16th Chief Minister of Sabah since 29 September 2020
• Style: Consensual, lower-key than predecessors; described as a steady hand rather than a dramatic political figure
• Signature programme: Sabah Maju Jaya Development Plan (2021+)

At 70 years old in 2025, Hajiji's succession question is open — no clear PGRS heir-apparent has been publicly designated as of 2026. Potential successors discussed in Sabah political circles include senior PGRS figures and possible cross-party candidates from STAR or PBS, but no consensus has emerged publicly.

Deputy Chief Ministers (Sabah State Cabinet)

Sabah has historically had multiple Deputy Chief Ministers reflecting the three major ethnic blocs (Muslim, KDM Christian, Chinese). Under the GRS state government, Deputy CM positions have included:

• Bung Moktar Radin (UMNO Sabah / BN) — Deputy Chief Minister (until various reshuffles)
• Jeffrey Kitingan (STAR Sabah) — Deputy Chief Minister
• Joachim Gunsalam (PBS) — Deputy Chief Minister at various points
• Other constituent-party Deputy CM positions allocated across reshuffles

Exact incumbents in 2026 have shifted across the wobble cycles; the underlying logic of one-Muslim-one-KDM-one-Chinese Deputy CM allocation has generally held.

Federal Cabinet Representation (2026)

Following the 24 November 2022 unity government formation, GRS received the following approximate federal portfolios (composition has changed across reshuffles):

• Minister of Entrepreneur Development and Cooperatives (or similar portfolio) — held by a GRS leader
• Several Deputy Minister positions — across portfolios such as Tourism, Rural Development, Higher Education, Plantation
• Specific incumbents have rotated; the working principle is that GRS holds smaller portfolios than GPS but enough to maintain unity government participation

Constituent Party Presidents (2026, approximate)

• PGRS: Hajiji Noor (founder-president since 2022)
• STAR Sabah: Jeffrey Kitingan (long-time president)
• SAPP: Yong Teck Lee (founder, multiple presidential terms since 1994)
• PBS: Maximus Ongkili (long-time president, succeeded Joseph Pairin Kitingan)
• LDP: Smaller party; presidency held by senior Chinese-Sabah figure
• USNO (revived): Smaller party

Jeffrey Kitingan — A Key GRS Figure

Datuk Seri Panglima Dr. Jeffrey Kitingan is one of the most distinctive figures in Sabah politics:

• Born: 22 January 1949
• Family: Younger brother of Joseph Pairin Kitingan (founder of PBS and former Chief Minister 1985-1994)
• Political journey: Member of multiple parties over decades — PBS, PBRS, STAR Sabah (current vehicle since 2016)
• Federal role: Currently a Deputy Minister in the unity government cabinet
• Signature issues: MA63 implementation, KDM rights, Sabah federalist reform
• Public profile: Known for outspoken pronouncements on Sabah autonomy

Yong Teck Lee — SAPP

Datuk Yong Teck Lee: - Founded SAPP in 1994 - Former Chief Minister of Sabah (1996-1998 under the BN rotation system) - Continues as SAPP president and an active GRS figure - Has emphasised Sabah autonomy and Chinese-Sabah representation

Federal Parliamentary Seats (GRS, approximate)

(Note: published figures vary depending on whether aligned Sabah BN seats are counted within or outside the GRS bloc. The widely cited GRS-only figure is approximately 6 federal seats.)

Sabah State Elections (GRS Era)

Voter turnout: approximately 66.6% — depressed by COVID-19. Next Sabah state election is constitutionally due by approximately late 2025, with the actual date subject to the Chief Minister's recommendation to the Yang di-Pertua Negeri. (As of 2026-05-22, check current state assembly status — the 2025 dissolution and state election may have occurred or be pending.)

Federal Strongholds (Approximate)

GRS-held federal seats span various parts of Sabah: - PGRS seats — multi-ethnic constituencies in interior and coastal Sabah - STAR Sabah seats — KDM-majority constituencies (Keningau area, parts of interior) - SAPP seats — Chinese-mixed urban constituencies - PBS seats — KDM constituencies

The eight federal seats not in the GRS-Sabah BN orbit went variously to Warisan, DAP (Chinese urban — Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan), PKR and independents.

Opposition in Sabah

The non-GRS forces in Sabah include: - Warisan (Parti Warisan Sabah) — Shafie Apdal's vehicle; primary GRS opponent; KDM and multi-ethnic base - DAP-Sabah — Chinese urban seats (Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan, Tawau) - PKR-Sabah — Smaller presence; aligned with unity government federally - UMNO-Sabah / BN-Sabah — Coalition partner of GRS at state level but a separate national coalition

2020 Sabah State Election Breakdown (Approximate)

Within the GRS bloc, the approximate party-by-party allocation was: - Bersatu Sabah (now PGRS): ~11 seats - Sabah BN (UMNO Sabah): ~14 seats - STAR Sabah: ~6 seats - SAPP: ~2 seats - PBS: ~3 seats - LDP: ~2 seats

Sabah Demographic Profile

Sabah's ethnic composition (approximate, based on 2010 Census and updated estimates — exact figures vary by source and methodology):

• Kadazan-Dusun (KDM, including various sub-groups): ~17-18%
• Bajau (including Bajau Laut, Bajau Darat): ~14%
• Malay: ~5-6%
• Murut: ~3-4%
• Chinese: ~9-10%
• Indigenous others (Suluk, Tidong, Rungus, Lundayeh and many smaller groups): ~10-12%
• Non-Malaysian citizens / permanent residents / undocumented: significant but contested proportion (Project IC controversy)
• Indonesian-origin and Filipino-origin Muslim communities: significant, often classified within Malay/Bajau/Suluk categories in census

Sabah is unique in Malaysia for the prominence of indigenous Christian communities (especially KDM) and the complex citizenship politics around immigrant-origin communities.

The Project IC / RCI Issue

The "Project IC" allegation — that identity cards were issued to non-citizens (especially Filipino and Indonesian Muslims) for political reasons in the 1990s — has been a recurring controversy. The Royal Commission of Inquiry on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah (RCI, established 2012 under PM Najib Razak, reported 2014) documented systematic irregularities. The recommendations have been partially implemented; the political legacy remains contested. GRS, Warisan and most Sabah parties have made varying commitments on tightening voter rolls and citizenship verification.

Unity Government Position

GRS holds: - One or two full ministerial portfolios (composition varies by reshuffle) - Several deputy ministerial positions - Federal allocations to Sabah (Pan Borneo, infrastructure, MA63 deliverables)

This gives GRS: - Federal cabinet voice (smaller than GPS's but real) - Direct channel to PM via ministerial counterparts - Federal development funding negotiation power - Stability of Sabah state government (federal non-interference)

MA63 Implementation Progress (Unity Government Era)

Under the Anwar government, progress on MA63 for Sabah has included:

• Quarterly MA63 Implementation Working Committee meetings
• Increased Sabah representation in federal commissions
• Phased oil royalty discussions (still 5% as of 2025; pushing for 20% jointly with Sarawak)
• Greater state input on education curriculum
• Gas-related agreements (Sabah does not yet have a Petros-equivalent at the same scale — discussions on a Sabah Gas Aggregator concept have been ongoing)
• Restoration of MA63 Special Council mechanisms
• Symbolic and procedural wins

Outstanding fiscal demands (largely unmet): - 40% net federal revenue share (constitutional provision per MA63) - 20% petroleum royalty - Continental shelf jurisdiction - Full immigration-fee revenue retention

Sabah Maju Jaya Development Plan

Hajiji's signature initiative (announced 2021) aims to transform Sabah across:

Future Outlook

GRS is positioned for moderate stability but faces real challenges:

Strengths: - Hajiji's personal credibility as a consensual figure - Multi-ethnic coalition reflecting Sabah's diversity - Federal alignment securing development resources - "Sabah First" identity that resonates locally

Challenges: - Succession: Hajiji turning 71 in 2026; eventual handover question open - Coalition coherence: Multiple parties, occasional defections, wobble cycles - Sabah BN relationship: UMNO Sabah is both partner and rival - Warisan opposition: Shafie Apdal remains a credible alternative - Federal allocation disputes: Particularly oil royalty and 40% revenue - Indigenous and rural development: Sabah lags peninsular states in human development indicators

The Next Sabah State Election

Sabah's state assembly term expires by approximately late 2025. As of the most recent reporting available, dissolution and the actual election date are subject to the Chief Minister's recommendation. The contest is expected to be primarily between:

• GRS (and possibly with Sabah BN coordination, or in friction)
• Warisan (Shafie Apdal)
• PH-Sabah (DAP, PKR, Amanah) — possibly in cooperation with Warisan or GRS depending on federal alignment

The outcome will shape Sabah's political trajectory for the second half of the decade.

The 16th General Election (federal, due by November 2027)

Best Case for GRS: Holds or modestly increases its ~6 federal seats; remains a federal coalition partner.

Realistic Case: Holds 5-7 federal seats; coalition arithmetic remains relevant if federal parliament is hung again.

Worst Case: Drops to 3-4 if Warisan or PH gains traction; coalition relevance reduced.

Strategic Direction

GRS will continue: - Multi-coalition pragmatism federally - Sabah Maju Jaya implementation - MA63 implementation push (jointly with GPS) - State autonomy expansion - Sabah-first identity politics

The party's "transactional Sabah First" approach gives it tactical flexibility. Whether the unity government, a PN-led alternative or some new configuration emerges in 2027, GRS will aim to be a relevant federal partner.

Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) — The Sabah Dimension

MA63 is the inter-governmental treaty signed on 9 July 1963 in Marlborough House, London. The signatories on behalf of North Borneo (Sabah) included Donald Stephens (later Tun Fuad Stephens, who became the first Chief Minister of Sabah). The Federation of Malaysia came into being on 16 September 1963 — Malaysia Day.

The agreement entrenched constitutional safeguards for Sabah and Sarawak that distinguish them from peninsular states:

• Immigration autonomy: Sabah controls entry of foreign nationals AND peninsular Malaysians (work-pass / state-issued permit required)
• Land and natural resources: State jurisdiction under Schedule 9 of the Federal Constitution
• Native customary rights (NCR): Recognition of indigenous Kadazan-Dusun, Murut, Bajau, Suluk and other native land claims
• Education and language: State input on curriculum; English retained in state government use
• Religious affairs: No state religion in Sabah (unlike peninsular states); Islamic affairs administered separately by Majlis Ugama Islam Sabah
• Financial arrangements: 40% of net federal revenue derived from Sabah (this provision is the single most disputed MA63 item — Sabah has rarely received the full 40% in practice; the under-implementation is a continuing political grievance)

The 20-Point Memorandum (Sabah)

Before MA63 was finalised, the State of North Borneo presented a 20-Point Memorandum (1962) to the Inter-Governmental Committee chaired by Lord Cobbold. The 20 Points covered:

1. Religion (no state religion in Sabah)
2. Language (English retained for 10 years initially)
3. Constitution (separate Sabah constitution within federal framework)
4. Head of Federation (no objection to a paramount ruler)
5. Name of Federation ("Malaysia")
6. Immigration (state control)
7. Right of Secession (rejected by negotiators — not adopted)
8. Borneanisation (preferring local officers in Sabah public service)
9. British officers (transitional arrangements)
10. Citizenship (recognition of Sabah natives as full citizens)
11. Tariffs and finance (state revenue protections)
12. Special position of indigenous races (native rights affirmed)
13. State government (Sabah's own constitution)
14. Transitional period (gradual integration)
15. Education (state control of certain elements)
16. Constitutional safeguards (entrenched provisions)
17. Representation in federal Parliament (proportionate)
18. Name of head of state ("Yang di-Pertua Negeri")
19. Name of state ("Sabah," changed from "North Borneo")
20. Land, forests, local government (state jurisdiction)

The 20 Points were not enacted as a single legal document but the substance was woven into the Federal Constitution via Annex A of MA63 and into the Cobbold Report and IGC Report 1962.

Article 161A — The Native Protection Clause for Sabah

Article 161A of the Federal Constitution provides special protections for "natives" of Sabah and Sarawak. For Sabah, "native" under Article 161A(6) is defined as a person of any of these races (the list includes): Bajau, Bisaya, Brunei, Bukitan, Dusun, Kadayan, Kalabit, Kayan, Kenyah, Kelabit (and various sub-groups), Lun Bawang, Murut, Sino-native (Eurasian Sino-Kadazan), Suluk, Tidong and others. The list is broader and more inclusive than the peninsular "Malay" definition under Article 160(2).

In practice, Article 161A means a substantial majority of Sabah's population enjoys Bumiputera/native rights regardless of whether they are Muslim — Christian Kadazan-Dusun, Christian Murut and animist-tradition communities all qualify. This contrasts sharply with peninsular Bumiputera definition which is tied to Islam.

The 40% Revenue Provision

Among the most contentious MA63 items is the provision that Sabah should receive 40% of net federal revenue derived from Sabah. The provision is set out in Article 112C and Article 112D of the Federal Constitution (with cross-references to Schedule 10) and the related MA63 schedules. In practice:

• The federal government has historically argued that the 40% provision has been met through various aggregated transfers, grants and revenue-sharing.
• Sabah has argued that the 40% has never been fully implemented in cash terms.
• Periodic Sabah political demands include a comprehensive audit and reconciliation.
• Under the Anwar unity government, MA63 Implementation Working Committee discussions have included the 40% question but no major fiscal restitution has been announced as of 2025-2026.

Petroleum Royalty (5% vs 20%)

Under the Petroleum Development Act 1974, oil-producing states receive 5% cash royalty on petroleum extracted from their territory. Sabah, like Sarawak and Kelantan, has demanded 20%. The 30 September 2022 Federal Court ruling in the Sarawak State Sales Tax case opened a possible parallel path: states can impose sales tax on petroleum products within their territory under State List authority. Sabah has explored similar legal-fiscal approaches.

Continental Shelf Dispute

A long-running constitutional dispute centres on whether Sabah's territorial jurisdiction extends 12 nautical miles offshore (as the federal government argues) or to the full continental shelf (as Sabah and Sarawak argue). The Federal Court in earlier cases has tended toward the federal interpretation; GRS, GPS and successive Sabah/Sarawak state governments continue to contest.

Chief Minister Hajiji's Approach

Hajiji Noor has generally taken a constructive engagement approach to MA63: - Working through the Implementation Working Committee - Avoiding public confrontation with Putrajaya - Banking small wins (representation, symbolic restitution) - Reserving large fiscal demands (40%, 20% royalty) for continued political pressure

This is in contrast to more vocal Sabah voices (e.g., parts of STAR Sabah under Jeffrey Kitingan, parts of Warisan under Shafie Apdal) who push for faster and more dramatic restitution.

Sabah politics in the 2020s is best understood as a triangular contest among three poles: GRS (Hajiji), Sabah BN/UMNO Sabah (Bung Moktar Radin and successors) and Warisan (Shafie Apdal). The shifting relationships among these three define Sabah's political stability.

Pole 1: GRS (Hajiji Noor)

• Formed 9 September 2020 as multi-party umbrella
• Governs Sabah state since 29 September 2020
• Federally aligned with Anwar unity government since 24 November 2022
• Dominant constituent: PGRS (founded 2022 by Hajiji)
• Other constituents: STAR Sabah, SAPP, PBS, LDP, USNO (revived)
• Approximate state seats: ~24 (of 73, excluding Sabah BN coordination)
• Approximate federal seats: ~6

Pole 2: Sabah BN / UMNO Sabah

• UMNO entered Sabah in 1991; became dominant 1990s-2000s
• Lost state power in 2018 (Warisan won) and 2020 (GRS won)
• Coalition partner of GRS at Sabah state level since 2020
• Bung Moktar Radin (Sabah UMNO chief) served as a Deputy Chief Minister
• Federally aligned with Anwar unity government since 2022 (separately from GRS)
• Approximate Sabah state seats won in 2020: ~14 (out of 73)
• Internal tensions with peninsular UMNO over Sabah autonomy and candidate selection

Pole 3: Warisan (Parti Warisan Sabah)

• Founded 17 October 2016 by Shafie Apdal after he left UMNO
• Governed Sabah 2018-2020 (Shafie was 15th Chief Minister)
• Lost narrowly in September 2020
• Approximate state seats won in 2020: ~23 (out of 73, plus PH allies bringing total opposition to ~32)
• Federally aligned with unity government since 2022 (after initial post-GE15 backing of Anwar)
• Multi-ethnic coalition with strong KDM and Muslim-Sabahan support
• Shafie Apdal: born 24 January 1957 in Semporna, Sabah; remains Warisan president

Triangular Dynamics

The three poles interact in shifting patterns:

The 2025 State Election Question

As Sabah approaches its next state election (constitutionally due by late 2025), the triangular geometry will be tested:

• Will GRS and Sabah BN contest as allies again (a "Sabah unity government" model)?
• Will Warisan contest independently or with PH allies (DAP, PKR, Amanah-Sabah)?
• Will GRS face internal contests (especially PGRS vs other constituents over candidate slates)?
• Will federal-level coalition arrangements (PH-BN-GPS-GRS) translate into state-level cooperation?

The early signals from 2024-2025 suggested a complex contest with multiple possible scenarios — but the final shape is being determined in real-time.

The Wobble Cycles

Since September 2020, the Sabah state government has experienced multiple "wobble cycles":

• Late 2022 wobble: Following GE15, speculation about GRS-BN realignment
• 2023 wobble: Reported tensions between PGRS and Sabah BN over portfolio allocation
• 2024 wobble: Defection rumours from individual MLAs; constitutional questions
• 2025 wobble (if any, as of writing): Pre-election positioning

Each wobble has been navigated through Hajiji's personal coalition management. The cumulative effect: Sabah politics is structurally less stable than Sarawak's, where GPS's 76/82 dominance leaves little room for instability.

Sabah has had 16 Chief Ministers since joining Malaysia in 1963. (Some sources count differently due to interim and acting appointments.) The lineage reflects Sabah's complex multi-ethnic and multi-party politics, including a notable rotation system in the 1990s.

1. Tun Fuad Stephens (UNKO/USNO predecessor) — 16 September 1963 to 31 December 1964

First Chief Minister of Sabah (then North Borneo at federation, renamed Sabah). KDM leader, key MA63 negotiator. Stepped down after about 15 months.

2. Tan Sri Peter Lo Sui Yin (SCA, allied with USNO) — 1 January 1965 to 12 May 1967

Second Chief Minister. Chinese-Malaysian politician of the Sabah Chinese Association.

3. Tun Mustapha Harun (USNO) — 12 May 1967 to 31 October 1975

Founder of USNO and a dominant Sabah figure of the 1960s-1970s. Bajau-Suluk leader, friend of independent Philippines and Indonesia. Oversaw rapid Islamisation and Malayisation of Sabah administration. Resigned in 1975 amid mounting controversy.

4. Tun Mohammad Said Keruak (USNO) — 1 November 1975 to 18 April 1976

Brief interim Chief Minister between Mustapha and Harris Salleh.

5. Datuk Harris Salleh (Berjaya) — 18 April 1976 to 22 April 1985

Berjaya party founder. Defeated USNO in the 1976 state election. Oversaw Sabah's economic modernisation but became unpopular by mid-1980s.

6. Tun Fuad Stephens (Berjaya, second term) — Brief return planned but died in tragic air crash 6 June 1976

Note: Tun Fuad Stephens led Berjaya to victory in 1976 and was sworn in as Chief Minister but died in the Double Six air crash on 6 June 1976, just weeks into his second term. He is sometimes listed as the 6th Chief Minister, with Harris Salleh succeeding him. (Lineage numbering varies by source.)

7. Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan (PBS) — 22 April 1985 to 17 March 1994

Founder of PBS (March 1985). Defeated Berjaya in the dramatic 1985 state election after a long midnight wait for swearing-in. First KDM Christian Chief Minister. Major figure in Sabah politics for decades. Resigned 1994 after PBS left BN and BN re-engineered the state assembly.

8-11. Rotation System (1994-1996)

After Pairin's resignation, BN-Sabah implemented a rotation system where the Chief Minister position rotated among the three main ethnic blocs (Muslim, KDM, Chinese) at fixed intervals. Chief Ministers during this period included:

• Tan Sri Sakaran Dandai (UMNO) — 1994
• Datuk Salleh Said Keruak (UMNO) — 1994-1996
• Datuk Yong Teck Lee (SAPP, then BN-aligned) — 1996-1998
• Tan Sri Bernard Dompok (UPKO/PBS-S, KDM) — 1998-1999

The rotation system was abandoned by 1999 as it proved politically unstable.

12. Datuk Osu Sukam (UMNO) — 1999-2001

UMNO Chief Minister. Sabah BN power consolidation period.

13. Tan Sri Chong Kah Kiat (LDP) — 2001-2003

Chinese-Malaysian Chief Minister; brief term.

14. Datuk Seri Musa Aman (UMNO) — 27 March 2003 to 10 May 2018

Longest-serving Sabah Chief Minister of the BN era — over 15 years. Brother of foreign minister Anifah Aman. Resigned (or was effectively displaced) on 10 May 2018 following the BN federal defeat. Faced multiple corruption charges subsequently; the charges were dropped or otherwise resolved in various proceedings 2018-2022. In July 2020 he made the dramatic majority-takeover claim that triggered the snap state election.

15. Datuk Seri Mohd Shafie Apdal (Warisan) — 12 May 2018 to 29 September 2020

Warisan founder and president. Bajau leader from Semporna. Former UMNO Vice-President; left UMNO 2016 to found Warisan. Defeated BN in the 9 May 2018 state election and was sworn in as 15th Chief Minister three days later. Oversaw Warisan-PH state government 2018-2020. Pre-empted Musa Aman's July 2020 takeover by advising dissolution; lost the subsequent September 2020 snap election narrowly.

16. Datuk Seri Panglima Haji Hajiji Noor (PGRS / GRS) — 29 September 2020 to present

Current Chief Minister. Bajau-Suluk leader from Tuaran. Former Bersatu Sabah chairman; founded PGRS in 2022. Has navigated multiple wobble cycles and federal coalition transitions to retain the Chief Minister position. As of 2026 remains GRS chairman and Sabah's 16th Chief Minister.

Notes on Numbering

Different sources count Sabah's Chief Ministers differently — the 16-numbered list above is one common rendering. Some sources count Tun Fuad Stephens' two terms as separate entries (making Hajiji the 17th), others treat the brief 1994-1999 rotation appointees variably. The substantive history is more important than the precise numbering.

Yang di-Pertua Negeri (Governors) of Sabah

The Sabah head of state (constitutional monarch-equivalent) is the Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah, appointed for renewable four-year terms by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the advice of the Sabah state government. Notable holders include Tun Fuad Stephens (1973-1975, before becoming Chief Minister again) and more recently Tun Juhar Mahiruddin (long-serving Governor through the 2020 dissolution). The current Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah as of 2026 should be verified against official records.

Sabah's political distinctiveness is rooted in its extraordinary indigenous diversity. Sabah has over 30 recognised indigenous groups, plus significant non-indigenous communities — making it the most ethnically diverse state in Malaysia.

Kadazan-Dusun-Murut (KDM) — Indigenous Christian-Majority Bloc

The "KDM" grouping covers three closely-related but distinct indigenous communities:

• Kadazan — predominantly coastal and lowland; approximately 8-10% of Sabah population; Penampang-Papar-Putatan core
• Dusun — predominantly interior and highland; approximately 8-10% of Sabah population; Tambunan-Ranau-Kota Marudu core
• Murut — interior southern Sabah; approximately 3-4% of Sabah population; Tenom-Keningau-Nabawan-Pensiangan core

Combined KDM population: approximately 19-22% of Sabah — a significant bloc but not a majority. Religious composition: predominantly Christian (Catholic and various Protestant denominations) with substantial animist-traditional and Muslim minorities (Muslim Kadazan and Muslim Dusun communities exist).

KDM political representation is distributed across: - PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah) — historically the primary KDM Christian political vehicle since 1985 (Joseph Pairin Kitingan) - STAR Sabah — Jeffrey Kitingan's vehicle (Joseph Pairin's younger brother) - Upko (United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation) — KDM-focused; aligned with Warisan/PH at various points - Warisan — significant KDM membership - PGRS, SAPP and others — KDM members across multiple parties

The Kadazan-Dusun cultural movement (notably the Kaamatan harvest festival, celebrated 30-31 May annually) is a key cultural anchor for KDM political identity.

Bajau — Coastal Muslim Community

The Bajau (sometimes called Bajau Laut for the sea-dwelling sub-group, Bajau Darat for land-dwelling) form approximately 14% of Sabah's population, predominantly Muslim. Concentrated in:

• West Coast Bajau — Kota Belud area
• East Coast Bajau — Semporna, Lahad Datu, Kunak, Sandakan

Politically, Bajau community is split across multiple parties: - UMNO Sabah — historical major Bajau political vehicle - PGRS / Bersatu Sabah — Hajiji Noor is Bajau-Suluk - Warisan — Shafie Apdal is Bajau (Semporna) - USNO (revived) — historical home

The Bajau vote is critical for any Sabah-Muslim political vehicle.

Murut — Southern Sabah Interior

The Murut (approximately 3-4%) are concentrated in the southern interior — Tenom, Keningau, Nabawan and Pensiangan. Historically warrior peoples; now a substantial part of the KDM Christian electoral bloc. Politically represented within PBS, STAR Sabah and other KDM-friendly parties. Murut concerns: native land rights, infrastructure, education access.

Suluk — Sulu-Origin Muslim Community

The Suluk community (originally from the Sulu Archipelago, now southern Philippines) has a significant presence in eastern Sabah (Sandakan, Tawau, Semporna). Religious composition: Muslim. Hajiji Noor is partly Suluk. The Suluk vote intersects with broader Sabah-Muslim politics.

Chinese-Sabah

Sabah Chinese form approximately 9-10% of the population, concentrated in: - Kota Kinabalu (Hakka and various) - Sandakan (Hokkien and Hakka) - Tawau (Hakka) - Sibuga, Kudat, Beaufort

Politically split between: - SAPP (GRS) — Yong Teck Lee's vehicle since 1994; multi-ethnic but Chinese-prominent - LDP (GRS) — Chinese-focused; smaller - DAP-Sabah — strong in urban Chinese areas (KK, Sandakan) - MCA-Sabah — minimal presence

The Chinese vote in Sabah is highly contested in urban constituencies.

Other Indigenous Groups

Sabah recognises many smaller indigenous groups, each with distinct languages and traditions: - Rungus — northern Sabah (Kudat) - Lundayeh / Lun Bawang — interior Sabah, also in Sarawak and Indonesian Kalimantan - Bisaya — Beaufort area (also in Sarawak) - Tidong — Tawau-Tarakan area (also in Indonesian Kalimantan) - Iranun — coastal western Sabah - Idahan — Lahad Datu area - Many others — Sabah's indigenous diversity is exceptional

Political representation for smaller groups typically operates through KDM-umbrella parties (PBS, STAR, Upko) or through individual MLA candidacies within larger coalitions.

Indonesian-Origin and Filipino-Origin Communities

Sabah has significant communities tracing origins to: - Indonesian Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Java, Sumatra — migration over decades for plantation and construction work - Southern Philippines (Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi) — long-standing communities plus more recent migration

The political status of these communities is complex. Some are full citizens (sometimes via irregular processes alleged in the RCI on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah report 2014), some hold permanent residency, others are undocumented. Voter rolls have been repeatedly contested. GRS, like all Sabah parties, must navigate this terrain carefully.

Pan Borneo Highway Sabah Portion

The Sabah portion of the Pan Borneo Highway (PBH) is approximately 1,023 km, linking Sindumin (Sarawak border) through Beaufort, Papar, Kota Kinabalu, Tuaran, Kota Belud, Kudat, Ranau, Sandakan, Lahad Datu, Tawau and onward to Kalabakan. Status:

• Phase 1: Major sections under construction with multiple contract packages
• Cost: Federal allocations have exceeded RM 12-15 billion for the Sabah portion alone, with revised totals climbing higher
• Progress: As of 2024-2025, Sabah PBH completion lagged the Sarawak portion. Major delays attributed to terrain, land acquisition, contractor disputes and COVID-19 disruption.
• Politics: PBH delivery is one of Hajiji's key talking points with Putrajaya. Fadillah Yusof (DPM, former Works Minister) is a key federal counterpart.

Federal Development Allocations to Sabah

Under the Anwar unity government (2022+), federal development allocations to Sabah have ranged in the multi-billion ringgit band annually (precise figures vary by Budget cycle and exclude statutory transfers and Petronas-related flows). Allocation has covered:

• Pan Borneo Highway
• Rural electrification (Sabah has the highest rate of unconnected households in Malaysia — Bornoe Power Sdn Bhd and Sabah Electricity Sdn Bhd serve scattered rural communities)
• Water supply (Sabah Water Department serves limited coverage; rural water access is patchy)
• Healthcare (Queen Elizabeth Hospital KK, Hospital Tawau and Hospital Sandakan are key tertiary centres; rural clinics are sparse)
• Education (Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Politeknik Kota Kinabalu and other tertiary institutions)
• Telecommunications and 5G

GRS has consistently argued these allocations remain inadequate relative to Sabah's population (approximately 3.4 million) and its underdevelopment relative to peninsular states.

Sabah State Revenue and the 40% Question

The constitutional provision that Sabah receive 40% of net federal revenue derived from Sabah is the single most disputed MA63 item. Practical state revenue sources include:

• Federal grants under Article 110-112C
• State sales tax (Sabah has not yet implemented a petroleum-products state sales tax comparable to Sarawak's 5% — discussions are ongoing)
• Land premium and rent
• Forest royalties and timber revenue
• Petroleum royalty (5% under PDA 1974)
• State enterprise dividends (e.g., Sabah Development Corporation entities)

Total annual Sabah state government revenue is in the low-single-digit billions of ringgit — far less than would be implied by the 40% provision.

Kota Kinabalu International Airport

KK International (KKIA) handles approximately 8-9 million passengers annually (pre-COVID; recovery trajectory by 2024-2025). Major routes to Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo, Shenzhen and others. Sabah has periodically lobbied for KKIA expansion and second-runway studies.

Sandakan, Tawau and Other Airports

Sabah has multiple commercial airports — Sandakan, Tawau, Lahad Datu, Mulu (linked via Sarawak), Labuan, plus over 20 rural STOL airstrips served by MASwings. Rural air connectivity is essential for interior Sabah communities.

Ports

Sabah ports include Kota Kinabalu Port, Sandakan Port, Tawau Port and others. Sapangar Bay Container Port (KK area) is the principal container facility. The Sabah Ports Authority operates several facilities; expansion has been a continuing political objective.

Sabah Oil and Gas

Sabah hosts significant petroleum operations: - Offshore Sabah — oil and gas fields operated by Petronas Carigali and various international partners (Shell, ExxonMobil, others in some periods) - Sabah Oil and Gas Terminal (SOGT) — at Kimanis (Papar district) - Kimanis Power Plant — gas-fired electricity generation - Sabah Ammonia Urea (SAMUR) — petrochemical complex

Sabah has long sought to develop downstream petrochemical industry rather than exporting raw gas. The Sabah Gas Aggregator concept (modelled on Sarawak's Petros) has been discussed but not implemented at the same scale as of 2025-2026.

Renewable Energy

Sabah has substantial renewable energy potential: - Solar — high insolation; rooftop and utility-scale projects expanding - Hydro — limited large-scale; some small hydro on interior rivers - Biomass — palm oil mill effluent and empty fruit bunch utilisation - Wind — limited

The Sabah state government has signalled interest in becoming a renewable energy exporter to Kalimantan (Indonesia's relocating capital city Nusantara is just across the border) but firm projects remain at planning stage.

Tourism Infrastructure

Sabah's tourism sector is among Malaysia's most developed: - Mount Kinabalu (4,095 m; UNESCO World Heritage) - Sipadan Island (premier dive destination; permits limited to 178/day) - Tunku Abdul Rahman Marine Park (off KK) - Sandakan-Kinabatangan (wildlife: orangutan, proboscis monkey, pygmy elephant) - Mulu-Mulu (across to Sarawak) - Cultural tourism (Kadazan Kaamatan, multi-ethnic festivals)

Tourism revenue is a major Sabah economic pillar; recovery from COVID-19 has been a key 2022-2025 priority.

GRS is a coalition, not a single party — and its constituents have shifting alliances, occasional defections and visible friction. GRS has been noticeably less coherent than GPS in Sarawak.

PGRS — Hajiji's Personal Vehicle

PGRS (Parti Gagasan Rakyat Sabah) was founded in 2022 by Hajiji Noor and a mass of former Bersatu Sabah members after disputes with peninsular Bersatu leadership. PGRS is widely understood as Hajiji's personal political vehicle and is the dominant GRS constituent.

Internal PGRS dynamics: - Strong Hajiji-aligned core - Multiple Bajau-Suluk Muslim leaders - KDM and Chinese members in supporting roles - Succession question (post-Hajiji) is an open internal matter - Party formation precise registration details should be verified against the Registrar of Societies

STAR Sabah — Jeffrey Kitingan

STAR Sabah (Parti Solidariti Tanah Airku) was originally a Sarawak-based party that Jeffrey Kitingan adopted as his Sabah vehicle in 2016 after various party transitions. Internal dynamics: - Personal vehicle for Jeffrey Kitingan - KDM (especially Kadazan-Dusun) base - Strong MA63 advocacy stance - Multiple state assembly seats won in 2020 - Federal Deputy Minister role for Jeffrey in unity government

SAPP — Yong Teck Lee

SAPP (Sabah Progressive Party) was founded 1994 by Yong Teck Lee. Internal dynamics: - Personal political legacy of Yong Teck Lee (former CM 1996-1998) - Multi-ethnic but Chinese-Sabahan prominent - Sabah autonomy emphasis - Smaller state assembly representation - Yong's age and eventual succession question

PBS — Maximus Ongkili

PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah) is the historic KDM Christian political vehicle, founded 5 March 1985 by Joseph Pairin Kitingan. Internal dynamics: - Founder Joseph Pairin Kitingan retired from active politics; died 6 December 2021 - Maximus Ongkili (long-time deputy president, multiple federal cabinet positions) succeeded - Internal succession after Maximus is an open question - PBS state seat representation has declined from 1980s peak - Brand strength remains in KDM Christian areas

LDP and USNO (revived)

Smaller constituents: - LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) — Chinese-Sabah base, smaller; senior leadership succession ongoing - USNO (revived) — historical Sabah Malay-Muslim party in modernised form; limited current state-level representation

Inter-Party Friction

Public friction among GRS constituents has been more visible than in GPS:

• 2020-2021: Initial coalition-formation tensions over candidate allocation
• 2022 PGRS formation: Major restructuring as Bersatu Sabah effectively transformed into PGRS
• 2023-2025: Periodic reports of:
• - PGRS vs Sabah BN portfolio disputes (state cabinet)
• - PBS-STAR competition for KDM voter base
• - SAPP grievances over coalition seat allocation
• - Internal succession positioning across constituents

Sabah BN — The Partner That Isn't

UMNO Sabah / Sabah BN is the most complex GRS relationship: - Technically a separate coalition (BN), not part of GRS - But works in coordination with GRS at state level - Bung Moktar Radin (Sabah UMNO chief) has been Deputy Chief Minister - Federal alignment: both GRS and BN are in unity government, but as distinct entities - Periodic threats of realignment, withdrawal, or confidence votes

Bersatu Sabah Question

After 2022, the status of "Bersatu Sabah" became contested: - Hajiji and most members defected to PGRS - Peninsular Bersatu (under Muhyiddin) retains some residual Sabah presence - Whether peninsular Bersatu remains in GRS, or has been excluded, is variably reported

Coordination Mechanism

GRS lacks a heavily institutionalised secretariat. Coordination occurs primarily through: - Hajiji's personal engagement with constituent leaders - Sabah state cabinet meetings - Periodic GRS Supreme Council meetings - Bilateral discussions on specific issues

This is more informal than GPS's established coordination mechanisms — a structural reason for GRS's greater internal volatility.

Sabah's relationship with Anwar Ibrahim's unity government since 24 November 2022 has been a defining feature of the current Malaysian political settlement, though less central than Sarawak's.

The November 2022 Decision

After GE15 on 19 November 2022 produced a hung parliament, GRS held approximately 6 federal seats — small in absolute terms but part of a critical East Malaysian bloc (GPS 23 + GRS ~6 + Warisan 3 = ~32 seats). The Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Sultan Abdullah of Pahang) summoned coalition leaders 22-23 November. After internal deliberation, GRS formally backed Anwar's unity government bid. Anwar was sworn in as 10th Prime Minister on 24 November 2022.

Cabinet Seats Held by GRS (as of 2026)

GRS holds: - One full ministerial portfolio (composition has varied across reshuffles — has included Entrepreneur Development and Cooperatives or similar economic portfolios) - Several Deputy Minister positions distributed across portfolios such as Energy Transition, Rural Development, Tourism, Plantation, Higher Education - Smaller federal footprint than GPS but meaningful access

Policy Wins Under Anwar Government

1. MA63 Implementation Working Committee — quarterly meetings continuing
2. Federal allocations to Sabah — multi-billion ringgit floor maintained
3. Pan Borneo Highway Sabah delivery — accelerated under unity government (with continuing delays)
4. Symbolic and procedural restitutions — increased state representation in federal commissions
5. Sabah Day (31 August) — increased federal recognition
6. Education and language — phased return of Sabah-specific elements

Outstanding Demands

• 40% net federal revenue (constitutional provision per MA63) — largely unmet
• 20% petroleum royalty (vs 5% statutory) — federal government has not agreed
• Continental shelf jurisdiction — disputed
• Full immigration-fee revenue retention — partial implementation
• Project IC follow-through — RCI recommendations partially implemented

The "Sabah First" Discipline

GRS has generally been disciplined in not openly antagonising the unity government, though less consistently than GPS. Public friction has been confined to specific issues (e.g., flood relief allocations, federal scholarship distribution, immigration enforcement) rather than coalition-level breaks. Hajiji has personally maintained working relations with Anwar; federal cabinet counterparts operate the day-to-day Sabah channel.

Risk Scenarios

• If Anwar government collapses (no-confidence motion, defections, royal intervention), GRS would likely pivot to whichever coalition can offer better Sabah terms. The 2020 PN alignment precedent shows GRS's flexibility.
• If Hajiji's personal position weakens (PGRS internal challenge, health, electoral defeat), the Sabah channel would degrade.
• If state-level wobbles escalate (Sabah BN defection, Warisan growth), state-federal coordination could fracture.

The Sabah-Putrajaya equilibrium under Anwar is best described as conditional cooperation — each side gets enough to keep the arrangement alive, neither side gets full satisfaction.

Comparison with Sarawak (GPS)

GRS's unity-government relationship is similar in structure to GPS's but smaller in scale:

Both are essential to unity government majority arithmetic; GPS is structurally more important; GRS is structurally more volatile.

GRS's political trajectory has been substantially shaped by — and has in turn shaped — a series of legal-constitutional milestones around Sabah's status. Selected milestones:

29 July 2020 — Dissolution of the Sabah State Legislative Assembly

Following former CM Musa Aman's claim to have assembled a majority, then-CM Shafie Apdal advised the Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah to dissolve the state assembly. The dissolution was granted. The constitutional question — whether the Yang di-Pertua Negeri was bound to accept the advice given the competing majority claim — became a subject of academic and political debate. The dissolution stood, triggering the 26 September 2020 snap election.

Federal Court — 30 September 2022 — *Petroliam Nasional Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak*

Though a Sarawak case, the ruling has direct implications for Sabah. The Federal Court affirmed Sarawak's constitutional authority to impose State Sales Tax on petroleum products under the State List. Sabah has explored similar legal-fiscal approaches, though as of 2025-2026 has not yet implemented an equivalent petroleum-products state sales tax at the same scale.

RCI on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah (2012-2014)

The Royal Commission of Inquiry on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah was established by the Najib government in 2012 and reported in 2014. Key findings: - Systematic irregularities in citizenship issuance in Sabah, particularly during the 1990s - The "Project IC" allegation was largely substantiated - Recommendations included voter roll cleansing, citizenship review processes, and immigration enforcement - Implementation of recommendations has been partial and politically contested

The RCI report remains a touchstone in Sabah political debate, particularly during state elections.

Native Customary Rights Cases

A series of Sabah court rulings have addressed Native Customary Rights (NCR) claims of Kadazan-Dusun, Murut and other indigenous communities. Major cases have included disputes over: - Forest reserves and logging concessions - Plantation development on customary land - Sipitang and other coastal NCR claims - Hydropower-related land disputes (less prominent in Sabah than Sarawak)

Sabah High Court rulings have generally been mixed — some pro-native, some pro-development — and many cases have been appealed to the Court of Appeal and Federal Court.

The 2019 Constitutional Amendment (Failed) and 2021 Amendment (Passed)

The April 2019 amendment to restore Article 1(2) wording (listing Sabah, Sarawak and Malaya as three equal entities) failed (short by 10 votes) — partly because GRS's predecessor Sabah parties were divided. The December 2021 amendment under the Ismail Sabri government passed with broader East Malaysian support including GRS.

Sabah State Sales Tax — Exploration

Sabah has periodically discussed imposing a state sales tax on petroleum products, modelled on Sarawak's 2018 amendment (which was upheld by the Federal Court in 2022). As of 2025-2026, Sabah has not implemented such a tax at the full Sarawak-equivalent scale, though preliminary legislation and federal-state discussions have been reported.

Continental Shelf Litigation

The constitutional dispute over Sabah's territorial jurisdiction offshore — 12 nautical miles (federal position) vs full continental shelf (state position) — has been litigated in various forms. The Federal Court has tended toward the federal interpretation. GRS continues to contest, jointly with GPS.

Citizenship and Voter Roll Litigation

Multiple election petitions in Sabah have raised questions about voter roll accuracy and citizenship status. The pattern has been: contested petitions, some procedural rulings, but limited substantive change to overall voter rolls. The Sabah Election Commission and the federal Election Commission have coordinated on voter roll maintenance, but the underlying political contestation continues.

Sulu Sultanate Compensation Claim — 2022-2024

A high-profile international arbitration matter, related to but separate from GRS politics: heirs of the former Sultanate of Sulu sought a USD 14.92 billion award against Malaysia in connection with disputed Sabah revenue. A French arbitration tribunal made a controversial award in 2022; Malaysia has contested in multiple jurisdictions. The matter is ongoing as of 2025-2026. While not a GRS-specific issue, it intersects with Sabah's historical territorial status and is a recurring topic in Sabah political discourse.

Going Forward

GRS legal strategy continues to push the boundaries of state authority on:

• Petroleum exploration licensing (currently federal under PDA 1974)
• State sales tax on petroleum products (Sarawak model)
• Continental shelf jurisdiction (disputed)
• Foreign worker quotas (state immigration authority)
• Education curriculum (concurrent list disputes)
• Voter roll integrity (RCI follow-through)

Like GPS, GRS's approach is generally patient, incremental and constitutional rather than confrontational — though with somewhat more variation across constituents (Jeffrey Kitingan's STAR Sabah is more vocal; PGRS tends toward quieter negotiation).